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THE KILLING WORDS? How THE NEW
QUALITY-OF-LIFE ETHIC AFFECTS PEOPLE
WITH SEVERE DISABILITIES
Teresa HarveyParedes
HE quality-of-life ethic was traditionally used to measure environ-
mental conditions that either improved or impaired the quality of a
person's life. Reformers used this traditional concept to increase the
standard of living by improving working conditions, health care, education,
and other living conditions.' In the wake of the bioethics movement, how-
ever, the dynamics of the quality-of-life ethic have been drastically altered.
Throughout the last few decades, courts gradually accepted this altered
ethic, resulting in tragic consequences for people with severe disabilities.
Now, rather than measuring conditions that improve life, the quality-of-life
ethic has come to measure the worth of a person's life to herself and those
around her, and, according to some ethicists, the very personhood of an indi-
vidual. Human life is now a relative concept, and personhood - when it
begins, what it is, and when it ends - may depend on a quality-of-life
determination.
In 1942, the American Journal of Psychiatry carried an article written by
Foster Kennedy, M.D., president of the Euthanasia Society. 2 Kennedy
called for the involuntary euthanasia of children who, at five years of age,
were diagnosed as defective by a medical team. If the team determined the
child was "hopelessly unfit" and had "no future or hope of one,' ' 3 then eu-
thanasia was appropriate. Kennedy redefined the children with disabilities
to justify his recommendation. No longer were they children, but "hopeless
defectives," "nature's mistake[s]," "tortured and convulsed, grotesque and
absurd, useless and foolish and entirely undesirable." 4 Kennedy also rede-
1. See infra notes 24-29 and accompanying text for additional discussion of the tradi-
tional use of the quality-of-life ethic.
2. Foster Kennedy, The Problem of Social Control of the Congenital Defective, 99 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 13 (1942). The Euthanasia Society was the forerunner of today's Society for the
Right to Die. Rita L. Marker et al., Euthanasia: A Historical Overview, 2 MD. J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL IssuEs 257 (1991). The Euthanasia Society was formed for the purpose of legalizing
euthanasia and hoped "eventually to legalize the putting to death of nonvolunteers beyond the
help of medical science." Statement of Charles E. Nixdorff, Euthanasia Society Treasurer
quoted in 'Mercy' Death Law Proposed in State: Euthanasia Society Drafts Bill to Legalize
Painless Killing ofIncurables, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 27, 1939, at 21.
3. Kennedy, supra note 2, at 14.
4. Id. It is interesting to note that Kennedy argued against euthanasia of people with
manic-depressive psychoses, stating that to do so would "make a great happiness for the pres-
ent and in the second generation; but.., would produce a population of Babbits, or mediocri-
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fined the death of these children with disabilities: Involuntary euthanasia
was "a merciful and kindly thing to relieve that defective... of the agony of
living."'5 At that time, Kennedy's ideas were considered out of the bioethics
mainstream. After the horrors of the Nazi killings were discovered follow-
ing World War II, his plan had even less public support. 6
Yet today, fifty years after Kennedy's first call, his echo is heard in the
voices of doctors, ethicists and judges, who, using the altered quality-of-life
ethic, advocate the "nontreatment" of newborns whose lives are "meaning-
less"7 and the "right to refuse medical treatment" to adults with physical or
mental disabilities. Today, the killing words are dressed in caring terms,
compassionately calling for the rights of people with disabilities to "self-de-
termination," 9 and to "death with dignity." 10 For children and mentally
disabled people who cannot exercise their own "self-determination," substi-
tuted judgment, proxy or the right to privacy 1 conveniently fills in the gap.
A closer look at real-life situations, however, reveals that self-determination
is provided only when the court believes the disabled persons should die;
they are allowed to die only when the courts believe they have no dignity;
ties, capable of pushing but not of leaping; and it's the leap that counts." Id. at 13.
Additionally, Kennedy opposed euthanasia of people with terminal illness. Id. at 15. Eutha-
nasia was appropriate only for mentally disabled people. According to Kennedy, people with a
mental age of eight or nine should be institutionalized, sterilized and "taught simple manual
work." Id. at 13-14. People with mental ages less than eight were candidates for euthanasia.
"So the place for euthanasia, [according to Kennedy] is for the completely hopeless defective:
nature's mistake; something we hustle out of sight, which should never have been seen at all."
Id. at 15.
5. Id.
6. In the 1920s the debate over eugenics and the right of people with terminal illness to
die raged in Germany and ended with tragic consequences in the 1940s. While some scoff at
comparisons between Nazi Germany and today, the parallels are ominous. For an in-depth
analysis of the similarities between pre-war Germany and the debate as it is currently framed
in the United States, see HUGH G. GALLAGHER, BY TRUST BETRAYED: PATIENTS, PHYSI-
CIANS, AND THE LICENSE TO KILL IN THE THIRD REICH (1990); Marker et al., supra note 2.
Following World War II, and revelations of the horrors of Nazi Germany, the United States'
eugenics movement receded.
7. See JOSEPH FLETCHER, HUMANHOOD: ESSAYS IN BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 140-438
(1979); JEFF LYON, PLAYING GOD IN THE NURSERY 237-50 (1985); ROBERT F. WEIR, SE-
LECTIVE TREATMENT OF HANDICAPPED NEWBORNS: MORAL DILEMMAS IN NEONATAL
MEDICINE 59-89 (1984).
8. See Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
9. Id.
10. Several states have attempted to pass "Death with Dignity" laws. In 1991, Washing-
ton citizens rejected Initiative 119, which would have legalized physically-assisted suicide at
the request of a mentally competent person who was terminally ill with a life expectancy of less
than six months. The initiative narrowly lost: Forty-six percent of the voters supported the
bill. '91: Euthanasia: Right-to-Die Proposal is Rejected: Supporters, Foes Say Debate Will Con-
tinue, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Nov. 6, 1991, at A7. In November 1992, California voters
narrowly rejected a similar measure by a 51-46% margin. B.D. Colen, Euthanasia Issue Lives
On, NEWSDAY, Nov. 10, 1992, at Fl. Maine, Oregon, Michigan, and Iowa legislatures have
considered the issue of legalizing physician-assisted suicide. Ralph Jimenez, Legislators Debate
Assisted-Suicide Bill, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 7, 1993, at 37. The New Hampshire, Connecticut,
and Virginia legislatures are currently considering the issue. Id. Proponents of such bills con-
sistently use "death with dignity" rhetoric to justify the proposed laws. Id.
11. See ALLEN E. BUCHANAN & DAN W. BROCK, DECIDING FOR OTHERS: THE ETHICS
OF SURROGATE DECISION MAKING 98-117 (1990).
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and privacy is a curtain behind which society can request the death of one of
its members that will have a negative impact on its resources or lifestyle.
How did this happen? How has the bioethics movement come to
recharacterize whose life is and whose life is not worth living? How has the
right to self-determination been turned on its head to justify nontreatment
(death) of people with disabilities, sometimes without regard to their own
desires?1 2 How have courts redefined severely disabled people as "bodily
environments,"' 13 and bioethicists redefined the quality-of-life ethic in terms
of maintaining an "acceptable" environment or an "acceptable" use of re-
sources, rather than in terms of improving the quality of people's lives?'
4
And, what are the ramifications for the targeted people - those with severe
physical or mental disabilities?' 5
This Comment will examine how bioethicists and courts are using the
quality-of-life ethic to justify the death of people with severe physical or
mental disabilities by asserting that their life is not worth living. 16 Part I
will explore the range of quality-of-life standards proposed by ethicists to
determine appropriate medical treatment.' 7 Part II will trace the use of the
quality-of-life ethic in the past two decades by courts in "right to die" or
"right to refuse medical treatment" cases involving people with severe disa-
bilities. 18 This section will demonstrate that judicial application of the qual-
ity-of-life ethic has proved devastating for people with severe disabilities
because the inherent biases of the decision-makers invariably render a pre-
sumption that death is preferable to life with severe disabilities. Part III will
explore how other decision-makers also apply the quality-of-life ethic with
detrimental consequences.' 9 Part IV will then discuss how uncertain diag-
noses and changing, ambiguous definitions often have deadly results for peo-
ple with disabilities regardless who the decision-maker is.20 Part V will
conclude by calling for a reexamination of this nation's attitude toward peo-
ple with severe disabilities. 2' We must recognize that inherent societal bias
against people with disabilities invariably contaminates the decision-making
12. See infra notes 173-183 and accompanying text.
13. McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617, 625 (Nev. 1990).
14. See text accompanying infra, note 49.
15. While the majority of cases, statutes, regulations, and other sources discussed in this
Comment use "handicapped" terminology, this Comment will utilize "disability" and "with
disabilities" terminology, which is the preferred language of most disability rights advocates.
See Mary Johnson, Kiss "Wheelchair-Bound" Goodbye, THE DISABILITY RAG, May-June
1987, at 31. "People first" terminology is also consistent with the language of the Americans
with Disabilities Act. This term simply refers to the need to emphasize that people are people
regardless of any labels attached to them, and these labels should be only of minimal or no
importance in determining a person's right to equal opportunity.
16. The basic issue of a person's right to die or the right to die for people who are termi-
nally ill is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, the only purpose is to demonstrate that if
these rights do or should exist, they apply no more to people with disabilities than to others.
For a thorough analysis of the right to die, see Thomas W. Mayo, Constitutionalizing the Right
to Die, 99 MD. L. REV. 103 (1990).
17. See infra notes 24-74 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 75-186 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 187-205 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 206-37 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 238-45 and accompanying text.
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process and justifies nontreatment. We must, therefore, refocus the quality-
of-life ethic away from the exclusionary model22 that favors death and back
to the model that considers how to improve the lives of people with severe
disabilities.
I. CURRENT QUALITY-OF-LIFE STANDARDS
"Thousands of medical ethicists and bioethicists, as they are are called, profes-
sionally guide the unthinkable on its passage through the debatable on its way
to becoming the justifiable until it is finally established as the
unexceptional. " 23
In the United States, the quality-of-life concept was traditionally framed
in the context of liberty: The right of every person to life, liberty and the
pursuit of happiness. 24 Beginning in the late 19th and early 20th century,
reformers pushed to equalize opportunity for all citizens.
The ideal of fundamental human equality had caught on. Not only
were all humans entitled to liberty but they were also entitled to a mini-
mal level of physical well being and the institutions which could guar-
antee this. The movement continued to expand so as to not only
include basic material goods (food, clothing, shelter health resources)
but also social goods: land reform, employment mobility, political par-
ticipation and franchise, free public education and today it is being ex-
tended to recreational and cultural opportunities .... The emphasis is
upon the minimal necessary conditions and the concern is inherently
equalitarian - that is, it stresses the insurance of these minimal goods
for all human beings. 25
Like other minority populations, people with disabilities were historically
denied equal access to the social, economic, and political systems in this
country. 26 In the past few decades, reformers worked to improve the qual-
ity-of-life of people with disabilities by providing for the right to education,27
for deinstitutionalization, 2 and most recently, for the passage of the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act of 1990.29
22. See infra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
23. Richard J. Neuhaus, The Return of Eugenics, COMMENTARY, Apr. 1988, at 15, 19.
24. William Aiken, The Quality of Life, in QUALITY OF LIFE: THE NEW MEDICAL DI-
LEMMA 17, 18 (James J. Walter & Thomas A. Shannon eds., 1990) [hereinafter THE NEW
DILEMMA].
25. Id. at 19.
26. See Martin H. Gerry & Celzne M. McWhorter, A Comprehensive Analysis in Federal
Statutes and Programs for Persons with Severe Disabilities, in CRITICAL ISSUES IN THE LIVES
OF PEOPLE WITH SEVERE DISABILITIES 495 (Luanna H. Meyer et al. eds., 1991) [hereinafter
CRITICAL ISSUES].
27. In 1973, Congress passed the Education for All Handicapped Children Act, Pub. L.
No. 94-194, 89 Stat. 773 (1973) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1485) which estab-
lished the right of all children to receive an appropriate education.
28. Geraldo Rivera's expose of the horrors of Willowbrook State School, an institution
housing 5400 people with mental disabilities, gripped the nation and resulted in a demand for
improved living conditions for all people with disabilities. For a comprehensive history of
Willowbrook State School, Rivera's expos6 and the resulting litigation, see GERALDO RIVERA,
WILLOWBROOK: A REPORT ON How IT IS AND WHY IT DOESN'T HAVE TO BE THAT WAY
(1972); DAVID J. ROTHMAN & SHEILA M. ROTHMAN, THE WILLOWBROOK WARS (1984).
29. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. II
[Vol. 46
1992] QUALITY-OF-LIFE
During the same period, however, a conflicting quality-of-life ethic devel-
oped within the medical community and, more recently in the judiciary,
around the right to die debate. Under this new ethic, 30 quality-of-life justi-
fies active or passive euthanasia of people with servere disabilities. This ethic
operates to exclude "some people from the moral community and concomi-
tantly from normal standards of moral treatment. The judgment is made
that because a person's 'quality-of-life' is below the desirable level, that per-
son's life is not worth living and we are justified in treating them accord-
ingly."' 31 The following sections explores several expressions of this altered
quality-of-life ethic.
A. QUALITY-OF-LIFE BASED ON REDEFINED PERSONHOOD
For more than two decades, Joseph Fletcher has advanced the ethic that
not all humans are persons. Fletcher declines to frame his inquiry into the
1990)). The Americans with Disabilities Act is a comprehensive civil rights statute that pro-
vides for the "elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities." 42 U.S.C.
§ 12101(b)(2). Title I prohibits discrimination in all aspects of employment. 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12111-12117. Title II prohibits discrimination in all services and programs provided by
state and local governments. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165. Title III prohibits discrimination
against individuals with disabilities by public accommocations. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-12189.
Title IV requires accessible telephone services. 47 U.S.C. §§ 225, 661.
30. References to the quality-of-life ethic in recent history actually began in the mid-nine-
teenth century in the context of eugenics and the social good. The Industrial Revolution re-
sulted in an increased quality of life for most people, providing improved health care, living
standards, and working conditions. GALLAGHER, supra note 6, at 74-95. Charles Darwin's
Origin of the Species, which expounded the "survival of the fittest" theory, however, negatively
altered society's perception of people with disabilities. Id. Published a few years later, The
Descent of Man, increased this negative perception. In it, Darwin lamented
We civilised men, on the other hand, do our utmost to check the process of
elimination; we build asylums for the imbecile, the maimed, and the sick; we
institute poor laws; and our medical men exert their utmost skill to save the live
of everyone to the last moment.... Thus the weak members of civilised societies
propagate their kind. No one who has attended to the breeding of domestic
animals will doubt that this must be highly injurious to the race of man.
CHARLES DARWIN, THE DESCENT OF MAN AND SELECTION IN RELATION TO SEX 136 (D.
Appleton & Co. ed., 1913) (1871). The eugenics movement grew out of Darwin's theories. Its
purpose was to improve and strengthen the human race. "They were out to make a better
world.... It would be a world in which all people of whatever race or nationality would live
just the way the American progressives did." GALLAGHER, supra note 6, at 77-78. This goal
necessitated that unfit people be prohibited from passing on their unfit conditions; and there-
fore, the unfit - disabled people and criminals -were prohibited from procreation. Id. at 84.
In the first two decades of the twentieth century, thirty states passed legislation to permit
sterilization of unfit persons. Id. at 82-83. This practice was upheld by the Supreme Court in
Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927), where Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes held that "[s]ociety
can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind. The principle that
sustains compulsory vaccination if broad enough to cover cutting the Fallopian tubes. ...
Three generations of imbeciles are enough." Id. at 207.
By 1923, forty-three states also had legislation authorizing the permanent institutionaliza-
tion of people with disabilities to protect them and society. The institutions were intended to
serve as work farms and colonies where disabled people could live out their lives without
harming society and without procreating. GALLAGHER, supra note 6, at 84. "The [reform]
campaign was full of good intentions, and its tone was as patronizing as a Jerry Lewis telethon:
'It is the thing to do for the feeble minded - get them out of the big world where they have
such a hard time because they are not like other folks.'" Id. at 85 (quoting MARK H. HAL-
LER, EUGENICS: HEREDITARIAN ATTITUDES IN AMERICAN THOUGHT 126 (1963)).
31. Aiken, supra note 24, at 20.
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right to die (or live) in terms of quality-of-life concepts, declaring instead
that if certain qualities do not exist in an "individual of the species homo
sapiens," then the individual is not a person, and therefore has no right to
life. 32 Fletcher's personhood checklist contains fifteen characteristics: mini-
mum intelligence, 33 self-awareness, 34 self control,35 sense of time,36 sense of
futurity, 37 sense of the past, 38 capacity to relate to others,39 concern for
32. FLETCHER, supra note 7, at 12-16. Fletcher holds that "[s]ynthethic concepts such as
human.., and person require operational terms, spelling out the which and what and when."
Id. at 12. Several other ethicists base nontreatment decisions upon a determination of per-
sonhood. Michael Tooley asserts that personhood is "a moral category that denotes the limits
of justifiable termination of life. If an entity, regardless of its age or maturity, can meet the
requirements of personhood, its life is given moral protection from arbitrary and indiscrimi-
nate destruction." See WEIR, supra note 7, at 152 (citing Michael Tooley, A Defense of Abor-
tion and Infanticide, in THE PROBLEM OF ABORTION 51, 53 (Joel Feinberg ed., 1973)).
According to Tooley, personhood has five requirements:
A capacity for desires about one's future, a capacity to have a concept of a self,
the actuality of being a conscious subject of experiences, a capacity for self-
consciousness, and the actuality of being a continuing subject of experiences and
other mental states .... '[I]n order for something to have a right to life it must
either now possess, or have possessed at some time in the past' these five
properties.
WEIR, supra note 7, at 153, (citing Michael Tooley, Decisions to Terminate Life and the Con-
cept of Person, in ETHICAL IsSUES RELATING TO LIFE AND DEATH 91 (John Ladd ed., 1979)).
Mary Anne Warren asserts five similar requirements for personhood: "consciousness, rea-
soning ability, self-motivated activity, the capacity to communicate, and the presence of self-
awareness." WEIR, supra note 7, at 156 (citing Mary Anne Warren, On the Moral and Legal
Status of Abortion, in TODAYS MORAL PROBLEMS 130-31 (Richard Wasserstrom ed., 1975)).
33. FLETCHER, supra note 7, at 12. Fletcher requires individuals to grade a 40 on the
Stanford-Binet Test in order to be assured of personhood.
Any individual of the species Homo sapiens who falls below an I.Q. grade of 40
in a standard Stanford-Binet test, amplified if you like by other tests, is question-
ably a person; below the mark of 20, not a person .... Mere biological life,
before minimal intelligence is achieved or after it is lost irretrievably, is without
personal status. This has bearing, obviously, on decision making in gynecology,
obstetrics, and pediatrics, as well as in general surgery and medicine.
Id.
Several other ethicists consider cognitive function to be the benchmark measurement for
determining whether the quality of a person's life is inadequate to justify life-sustaining treat-
ment. For example, Dr. Fred Plummer of the Cornell University Medical Center asserts: "I
believe that the meaning of life is cognition and self-awareness, not merely visceral survival.
The concept holds that when the cognitive brain has departed, the person has departed." Dr.
Fred Plummer, as quoted in Kathleen Stein, Last Rites, OMNI, Sept. 1987, at 58-60. See also
infra notes 50-59 and accompanying text.
34. FLETCHER, supra note 7, at 12-13.
35. Id. at 13. Fletcher asserts that if an individual cannot maintain self control and this
lack of control cannot be remedied through medical means, the individual is not a person. Id.
Under this standard, people with severe cerebral palsy or other physical disabilities that are
characterized by lack of muscle control are not persons.
36. Fletcher defines this requirement as the sense of the "passage of time." Id. at 13.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 14. This characteristic requires that the individual be capable of maintaining
interpersonal relationships. "Interpersonal relationships, of the sexual-romantic and friend-




others,4° capacity to communicate, 41 control of existence,42 curiosity, 43
changeability, 44 balance of rationality and feeling, 45 idiosyncrasy, 46 and ne-
ocortical function.47 Fletcher describes an individual who does not meet his
criteria as a "human vegetable [that] is progressively degraded while con-
stantly eating up private or public financial resources, ' '48 and asserts that a
moral obligation to permit euthanasia exists in such cases. 49
B. QUALITY-OF-LIFE BASED ON COGNITIVE FUNCTION
Dr. Ronald Cranford asserts that a person diagnosed as permanently un-
conscious should be declared dead, with no legal rights or liberties.5 0 In an
article written with David Randolf Smith, Cranford declared that a person
in a vegetative state has no interests in continued existence, lacks per-
sonhood and is instead a "creature of modem day medicine."' 51 More re-
cently, Cranford asserted that a minimum intellectual capacity beyond
consciousness is necessary to retain personhood. He recommends discontin-
uance of food and water from people with severe brain damage. According
to Cranford, their lives lack the requisite quality for personhood. He testi-
fied in Cruzan v. Harmon5 2 that he has "stopped fluids and nutrition on
patients who were conscious and who had some degree of interaction with
the environment," because their lives, in his estimation, were not worth
living. 53
40. Id.
41. Id. at 14-15.
42. Id. at 15. This characteristic seems related to self-control:
It is of the nature of man that he ... has only finite knowledge, freedom, and
initiative, but what he has of it is real and effective. Invincible ignorance and
total helplessness are the antitheses of humanness, and to the degree that a man
lacks control he is not responsible and to be irresponsible is to be subpersonal.
This item in the agenda applies directly, for example, in psychiatric medicine,




45. Id. at 15-16.
46. Id. at 16.
47. Id. This requirement is, according to Fletcher, the "cardinal indicator." Id. "Before
cerebration is in play, or with its end, in the absence of the synthesizing function of the cere-
bral cortex, the person is nonexistent. Such individuals are objects but not subjects." Id. In
addition to the fifteen characteristics, Fletcher listed five negative characteristics: "(1) Man is
not non- or anti-artificial ... (2) Man is not essentially parental ... (3) Man is not essentially
sexual... (4) Man is not a bundle of rights ... [and] (5) Man is not a worshipper." Id. at 16-
18.
48. Joseph Fletcher, Ethics and Euthanasia, in To LIVE AND LET DIE: WHEN, WHY
AND How 119 (1973).
49. Id.
50. Ronald Cranford & David R. Smith, Consciousness: The Most Critical Moral (Consti-
tutional) Standard for Human Personhood, 13 AM. J. L. & MED. 233, 241, 247 (1987).
51. Id. at 247.
52. Cruzan v. Harmon (Cir. Ct. Jasper County, Mo. 1988) (No. CV38-9P), cited in Medi-
cal Treatment Rights of Older Persons and Persons with Disabilities: 1991 Developments, 7
ISSUES IN L. & MED. 417 (1992) [hereinafter 1991 Developments].
53. Transcript, Cruzan v. Harmon (Cir. Ct. Jasper County, Mo. 1988) (No. CV38-9P),
cited in 1991 Developments, supra note 52. Cranford asserts that it is unethical to use a respira-
1992]
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Reverend Richard A. McCormick defines quality-of-life according to the
individual's potential to maintain human relationships. 54 According to Mc-
Cormick, a person's life has value "only insofar as it contains some potenti-
ality for human relationships. ' 55 If this potential is not present or "would
be utterly submerged and undeveloped in the mere struggle to survive,"
medical care is extraordinary and therefore nontreatment is justified.56
Nancy Rhoden's theory is consistent with McCormick's. According to
Rhoden, a person's quality-of-life is relative to their "ability to participate at
least minimally in those experiences that make life recognizably human" as
measured by their level of consciousness. 57 Based on this standard, medical
treatment 58 can be withheld from an individual who "will never be con-
scious[,] is in unremitting pain[,] will live only with major, highly restrictive
technology which is intended to be temporary (e.g., artificial ventilation),"
or "lacks potential for human interaction as a result of profound
retardation." 59
Both the personhood requirements and minimum intelligence require-
ments are dubious because the criteria are too susceptible to inaccuracy.
Measuring intelligence requires a minimum level of communication. Many
people with severe disabilities have multiple disabilities involving their neu-
ral, sensory, and physical functions, which may interfere with their ability to
communicate their knowledge and comprehension. All too often, this inabil-
ity to communicate is translated into a diagnosis of severe mental retarda-
tion.60 Even without multiple complications, people with severe mental
disabilities are especially difficult to accurately assess. Intelligence tests were
normed on nondisabled children and require knowledge of information
taught in regular elementary schools. Children with severe disabilities have
often been excluded from these experiences and therefore denied the oppor-
tor on persons who have severe brain damage with no hope of improvement. AP, Helga Wan-
glie, Woman in Right to Life Battle, CHI. TRIB., July 6, 1991, at C13. Joseph Fletcher also
included a minimum intelligence requirement in his personhood list. See supra note 33.
54. Richard A. McCormick, To Save or Let Die: The Dilemma of Modern Medicine, 229
J. AM. MED. Ass'N. 172, 175 (1974).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Nancy Rhoden, Treatment Dilemmas for Imperiled Newborns: Why Quality of Life
Counts, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 1283, 1322 (1985).
58. Food and water are included as medical treatment by Rhoden. Id. at 1329.
59. Id. at 1322-23. Rhoden also asserts that non-treatment is also justified with terminally
ill people, or, in the case of newborns, if they will not live past infancy. Id. Ruth Russell also
endorses this approach: "If one is no longer conscious or able to communicate with others as a
human being, one must say he is already socially, psychologically, and spiritually dead....
The traditional concept of the sanctity of life must be modified by concern for the quality-of-
life." 0. RUTH RUSSELL, FREEDOM TO DIE: MORAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS OF EUTHANASIA
220 (1977). In Medical Technology and the Law; IV Neo-natal Treatment Decisions, 103
HARV. L. REV. 1584 (1990), symposium members endorsed a standard that combined
Rhoden's standard with the 1934 Child Abuse Amendments Regulation's three-tiered ap-
proach. See infra notes 98-101 for a discussion of the approach taken in the Child Abuse
Amendment of 1984.
60. See Ian M. Evans, Testing and Diagnosis. A Review and Evaluation, in CRITICAL IS-
SUES, supra note 26, 25, 26-27.
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tunity to learn the necessary information.61
The 1989 Academy Award-winning movie My Left Foot depicted the true
story of Christy Brown, an Irish artist and author who was incorrectly la-
belled mentally retarded for most of his early life, until he learned to write
with his foot.6 2 The best selling book Nobody Nowhere is an autobiography
of Donna Williams, a woman with autism who was inaccurately labelled
deaf, retarded, emotionally disturbed and insane.63 Recent technological ad-
vances have vastly improved the ability to communicate for many people
with severe disabilities. Through techniques such as facilitated communica-
tion, persons labeled severely retarded are proving that they were inaccu-
rately diagnosed. For example, Arthur Wold, a Washington resident, was
labeled severely mentally retarded at age four when he could control neither
his movements nor his speech. Recently however, at thirty, he has learned
to communicate through facilitated communication, and has demonstrated
that while he was labeled severely retarded, he taught himself to read and
write.64 Other technological advances have been made enabling people with
severe disabilities to communicate, 65 which make reliance on communica-
tion ability highly suspect. There are many more accounts of other inaccu-
rate diagnoses - diagnoses which, according to Fletcher's analysis, would
have justified terminating lives and which were usually based on an inability
to communicate through normal methods. The lives of Wold, Brown, Wil-
liams, and countless other people with similar histories should call into
doubt any reliance on mental ability or intelligence because they prove that
many people labelled severely retarded are, in fact, merely unable to commu-
nicate through traditional methods.
C. QUALITY-OF-LIFE BASED ON HOME AND SOCIETAL CONTRIBUTION
The most formulaic standard for determining a minimum quality of life,
61. Id. Several well documented studies have demonstrated that many children have been
inaccurately labelled mentally retarded due to linguistic or cultural factors that limited their
knowledge of the test information. Id. at 27.
62. MY LEFT FOOT (Mirama Films 1989). Mr. Brown has cerebral palsy.
63. DONNA WILLIAMS, NOBODY NOWHERE: THE EXTRAORDINARY AUTOBIOGRAPHY
OF AN AUTISTIC 1992. Her autobiography is the first published first-person account of how a
person with autism experiences life.
64. Wold is now labeled autistic. See Hank Whittmore, He Broke the Silence, PARADE,
Sept. 20, 1992, at 8-9. Facilitated communication is a process by which a facilitator assists a
disabled person in typing on a keyboard, by supporting the person's hand, wrist, or arm. This
technique has also been successfully used to help people with autism, cerebral palsy, and
Down's syndrome communicate. Id.
65. See, e.g., Sandra Friedland, Computer Helps the Voiceless Speak, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
16, 1992, at NJ6 (discussing laptop computers equipped with voice synthesizers which enable
severely disabled children to communicate); Rose Kim, The Magic Touch: Keyboard Tech-
nique Helps Severely Disabled Students Learn to Communicate, L.A. TIMES, June 17, 1992
(discussing use of computer and facilitated communication for children with autism and other
speech disabilities); Randy Pausch & Ronald D. Williams, Giving CANDY to Children: User-
Tailored Gesture Input Driving and Articulartor-Based Speech Synthesizer: Communication
Assistance to Negate Disabilities in Youth, Communications of ACM, May 1992, available on
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File (describing ten-year project to design speech synthesizer to
children with severe disabilities).
1992]
SMU LAW REVIEW
QL= NE X (H+S),66 was concocted by Anthony Shaw67 and utilized by a
team of doctors at Oklahoma Children's Memorial Hospital in 1978 to make
treatment decisions for children born with spina bifida.68 The stated pur-
pose of the formula was to assist doctors in determining which babies born
with spina bifida to treat,69 and which to let die.70 The treatment decisions
were based on a prognosis of the newborn's future quality-of-life. 71 When
66. According to this formula, QL represents quality-of-life; NE represents natural en-
dowments, H represents home and family and S represents society. See Anthony Shaw, Defin-
ing the Quality of Life, 7 THE HASTINGS CENT. REP. 11 (1977), reprinted in THE NEW
MEDICAL DILEMMA, supra note 24, at 91.
67. Id.
68. Richard H. Gross et al., Early Management and Decision Making for the Treatment of
Myelomeningocele, 72 PEDIATRIC 450 (1983) [hereinafter Early Management]. Spina Bifida,
or Myelomeningocele, is a condition where cerebrospinal fluid and nerve roots are located
outside a child's body in a sac. Nerves located below the sac are damaged to some extent, so
the location of the sac is a main factor in the level of physical disability the child will have.
Children with spina bifida sometimes also have hydrocephalus, a condition where excessive
cerebral spinal fluid collects in the skull. Prompt medical treatment is necessary to prevent
skull deformities and brain damage. Sharon M. Paulus, Suit Filed in Oklahoma Alleging
Twenty Four Infants Died after Being Denied Beneficial Medical Treatment, 1 ISSUES L. &
MED. 321 (1986). While treatment is necessary to prevent increasing severity of the disability,
"[b]abies considered to have a poor prognosis [of quality of life] have a survival equal to that of
babies with a good prognosis, if they receive early surgical treatment." Richard H. Gross,
Newborns with Myelodysplasia - The Rest of the Story, 313 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1632, 1633
(1985) [hereinafter Gross, Newborns].
69. Children chosen for treatment would receive the medically indicated treatment which
usually consisted of an operation to close the sac to prevent infection and further damage.
When hydrocephalus is also present, medical treatment for this condition typically requires the
implantation of a shunt into the skull to drain the fluid. Paulus, supra note 68, at 321.
70. Children chosen to die would receive "supportive care," a euphemism for no care.
Supportive care consisted of making the child "comfortable" but did not include antibiotic or
sedative administration. Early Management, supra note 68, at 452. Of the thirty-three babies
selected for nontreatment, five families requested treatment against the team's recommenda-
tion. Two other babies were treated, but long after the initial decision not to treat was made.
Id. at 453. Carlton Johnson, born in 1982 with several disabilities including spina bifida and
hydrocephalus, was one of the children selected for nontreatment. The team diagnosed him as
"not a good baby," and recommended nontreatment. Carlton's mother was informed that
Carlton would "live six months without [treatment], and then with it, a year." Paulus, supra
note 68, at 325. Based on this information, she did not request the medically indicated treat-
ment and Carlton was sent to another facility for maintenance until death. One month after
his birth, Carlton was transferred back to Children's Memorial Hospital with severe respira-
tory distress, apnea, ear infection and dehydration. The doctors ordered that no tests or treat-
ment were to be given except suctioning to clear his airway and oxygen and cardiac
compressions as needed. In spite of this nontreatment, Carlton survived and was sent back to
the nursing facility. Sixteen months later, when it became obvious that he was not going to
die, Carlton received the appropriate surgery. However, the surgery could not correct the
enlargement of his head and the potential loss of intellectual and physical capabilities due to
the delayed surgery. The level of increased disability Carlton will have due to the long delay in
treatment remains to be seen. Id. at 325-26. The doctors did not recommend treatment for
thirty-three infants. If the family, however, requested treatment against the recommendation
of the team, the child would be treated. Early Management, supra note 68, at 453. Following
the publication of the experiment, families of several children filed a lawsuit alleging that
twenty-four infants died after being discriminatorily denied beneficial medical treatment at the
Oklahoma Children's Memorial Hospital, but were unsuccessful. Paulus, supra note 68, at
321. See Johnson by Johnson v. Gross, 125 F.R.D. 169 (W.D. Okla. 1989), aff'd 971 F.2d
1487 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 61 U.S.L.W. 3371 (1993).
71. The doctors acknowledged that infants, who had a poor quality of life prognosis had a
survival rate "equal to that of babies with a good prognosis, if they receive early surgical
treatment." Gross, Newborns, supra note 68, at 1633.
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the hospital received notice of a child born with spina bifida, a ten-member
team 72 convened and pursuant to the formula, conducted various diagnostic
tests on the infant to determine his physical and intellectual capacity (NE).
The team then attempted to ascertain the economic and intellectual re-
sources of his family (H), the family's physical proximity to an appropriate
medical facility and any governmental agency commitment to provide finan-
cial resources for the child's life care (S).73 Based on this evaluation, the
team made a treatment recommendation to the family. 74
II. THE COURTS AND THE QUALITY-OF-LIFE ETHIC
A. PRE-BIRTH
The appeal of the March of Dimes is 'Help Us to Prevent Birth Defects,'
but the way to prevent them is to prevent the birth of defective children. 75
Although the Supreme Court recently narrowed Roe v. Wade, 76 abortion
of a fetus with disabilities remains legal. 77 In some states, this right justifies
damage awards against doctors who fail to provide the mother with an op-
portunity to abort a disabled fetus through so called "wrongful birth" or
"wrongful life" claims. 78 A wrongful birth claim 79 is brought on behalf of
72. The team consisted of a physician's assistant, pediatrician, orthopedist, neurosurgeon,
urologist, nurse clinician, social worker, physical therapist, occupational therapist and a psy-
chologist. Id.
73. See Early Management, supra note 68, at 456. In Medical Technology and the Law:
IV Neo-natal Treatment Decisions, supra note 59, at 1605, symposium members agreed that
financial and emotional resource constraints as a valid criteria. "[T]he availability of expert
and loving long-term care is inextricably bound up with the quality-of-life prediction for a
seriously disabled infant." Id. Parents should be given broad decision-making discretion when
the child's prognosis is unclear provided they receive medical consultation. Id. at 1608. Ac-
cording to members, physicians should be given discretion to choose among treatment alterna-
tives and the judiciary "should allow for a reasonable margin of error in post hoc review" of
these decisions. Id.
74. See Early Management, supra note 68, at 452. The doctors reported that sixty-nine
infants were included in their study. They recommended thirty-six infants for treatment.
75. FLETCHER, supra note 7, at 113.
76. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
77. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992) (overruling the Roe trimes-
ter framework and adopting an undue burden analysis for abortion legislation by upholding
the fundamental right to abortion). Just as this paper is not intended to address the general
issue of a person's right to die, so too it is not meant to address the basic issue of a woman's
right to make private reproductive decisions. Rather, it is intended to address the ramifica-
tions of this right as it is applied to fetuses with disabilities, to demonstrate that the quality-of-
life ethic is being applied before as well as after birth.
78. See, e.g., Harbeson v. Park-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483, 491 (Wash. 1983) (holding that
"parents may avoid the birth of the defective child by aborting the fetus. The difficult moral
choice is theirs." (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973))).
79. At least twenty states recognize a cause of action for wrongful birth. See ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 24 § 2931 (West 1990); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8305(a) (1992 Supp.);
Robak v. United States, 638 F.2d 471 (7th Cir. 1981) (applying Alabama Law); Andalon v.
Superior Court, 208 Cal. Rptr. 899 (1984); Haymon v. Wilkerson, 535 A.2d 880 (D.C. 1987);
Kush v. Lloyd, 1992 Fla. LEXIS 2017 (Fla. Dec. 3, 1992); Moores v. Lucas, 405 So. 2d 1022
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Blake v. Cruz, 698 P.2d 313 (Idaho 1984); Siemieniec v. Lutheran
Gen. Hosp. 1512 N.E.2d 691. (Ill. 1987); Pines v. Moreno, 569 So. 2d 203 (La. Ct. App. 1990);
Proffitt v. Bartolo, 412 N.W.2d 232 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987), appeal denied, 420 Mich. 860
(1988); Smith v. Cote, 513 A.2d 341 (N.H. 1986); Hummei v. Reiss, 608 A.2d 1341 (N.J.
1991); Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807 (N.Y. 1978); Galigher v. Duke Univ., 638 F. Supp.
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the mother or father, alleging that the "negligent advice or treatment de-
prived them of the choice of avoiding conception or ...terminating the
prenancy."80 A wrongful life claim s ' is brought on behalf of the disabled
child, alleging that the child's quality-of-life is such that the fact that she was
born is an injury for which damages are recoverable, and "but for the de-
fendant doctor's negligent advice to or treatment of its parents, [she] would
not have been born."'82 In order for a plaintiff to prevail on a wrongful life
action, the court determines that "the fetal [child] had an interest in avoid-
ing her own birth, that it would have been bestfor [the child] if she had not
been born."83 Courts insist that recognizing wrongful life actions in no way
diminishes the value of disabled children's lives. Nevertheless, it cannot be
denied that these cases require a jury to determine that the quality of the
disabled child's life is so poor that it would be better if she had been aborted
before birth. In Turpin v. Sortini, for example, referring to children with
severe disabilties, the court held that "[c]onsidering the short life span many
of these children and their frequently very limited ability to perceive or enjoy
the benefits of life, we cannot assert with confidence that in every situation
there would be societal consensus that life is preferable to never having been
born at all." '8 4
979 (M.D.N.C. 1986), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 852 F.2d 773 (4th Cir. 1988) (applying
North Carolina Law); Phillips v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 544 (D.S.C. 1981) (applying
South Carolina law); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975); Naccash v. Burger, 290
S.E.2d 825 (Va. 1982); Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc. 656 P.2d 483 (Wash. 1983); James G. v.
Caserta, 332 S.E.2d 872 (W. Va. 1985); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 233 N.W.2d 372 (Wis.
1975).
At least three states have refused to recognize wrongful birth statutes. See Assolino v.
Dingfelder, 337 S.E.2d 528 (N.C. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 835, (1986); Atlanta Obstetrics
& Gynecology Group v. Abelson, 398 S.E.2d 557 (Ga. 1990); Wilson v. Kuenzi, 751 S.W.2d
751 (Mo.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 893 (1988).
80. Procanik v. Cilio, 478 A.2d 753, 760 (N.J. 1934).
81. Three states recognize some form of wrongful life claim. See Turpin v. Sortini, 643
P.2d 954 (Cal. 1982), Procanik v. Cillo, 478 A.2d 755 (N.J. 1984), Harbeson v. Parke-Davis,
656 P.2d 483 (Wash. 1982). Wrongful life claims have been rejected in at least twenty-one
states. See Elliott v. Brown, 361 So. 2d 546 (Ala. 1978); Pizano v. Mart, 790 P.2d 735 (Ariz.
1990); Walker by Lininger v. Eisenbaum, 764 P.2d 1202 (Colo. 1988); DiNatale v. Lieberman,
409 So. 2d 512 (Fla. Dist. App. 1982); Blake v. Cruz, 698 P.2d 315 (Idaho 1984); Siemieniec v.
Lutheran General Hospital, 512 N.E.2d 691 (Ill. 1987); Bruggeman v. Schimke, 718 P.2d 635
(Kan. 1986); Reed v. Campagnolo, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 245 (D.C. Md. 1993); Viccaro v.
Milunski, 551 N.E.2d 7 (Mass. 1990), Profflitt v. Bartolo, 412 N.W.2d 232 (Mich. App. 1987),
app. denied, 430 Mich. 860 (1988); Wilson v. Jienzi, 751 S.W.2d 741 (Mo. 1988); Azzolino v.
Dingfelder, 337 S.W.2d 528 (N.C. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 835 (1986); Smith v. Cote, 513
A.2d 341 (N.H. 1986); Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8 (N.J. 1979); Becker v. Schwart, 386
N.E.2d 806 (N.Y. 1978); Ellis v. Sherman, 515 A.2d 1327 (Pa. 1986); Phillips v. United States,
508 F. Supp. 537 (D.S.C. 1980); Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. 1984); James G. v.
Caserta, 332 S.E.2d 872 (W. Va. 1984); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 233 N.W.2d 372 (Wis.
1975), Beardsley v. Wierdsma, 650 P.2d 288 (Wyo. 1982).
82. Procanik v. Cillo, 478 A.2d at 760.
83. Smith v. Cote, 513 A.2d 341, 352 (N.H. 1986). The court refused to recognize the
wrongful life claim. Id. at 358.
84. Turpin, 643 P.2d at 962-63. The court cited Curlender v. Bio-Sciences Laboratories,
165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) as an example of when death might be preferable to
being born. In Curlender, the child had Tay-Sachs disease. According to evidence, the child
suffered from "mental retardation, susceptibility to other diseases, convulsions, sluggishness,
apathy, failure to fix objects with her eyes, inability to take an interest in her surroundings, loss
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One court intimated that a wrongful life theory could be applied against
the parents who know that their fetal child has disabilities and decide never-
theless to carry the child to term. According to Curlender v. Bio-Science
Laboratories,85 the parents could be held liable "for the pain, suffering, and
misery which they have wrought upon their offspring."'8 6 While this is cur-
rently a minority position8 7 and has not yet been applied in any other re-
ported case, there are several indications that compulsory abortion is gaining
acceptance in the medical community.8" For example, Joseph Fletcher
makes the following argument for compulsory abortion of fetuses with
disabilities:
We protect battered children after birth; why not before? Could we call
a knowing conception of a diseased baby "battery"? It is clearly an
injury....
[W]e are not morally obligated to have children; no law requires
it .... If we do have them, however, we are morally obliged to have the
healthiest children possible, and actually ought not to have children if
we know they are genetically doomed to grievous suffering....
. . . The conclusion here is that (1) having genetic information, we
ought to set a minimum quality standard of human health and poten-
tial, for selective reproduction; (2) we ought not to bring children into
the world if they will fall below the minimum standard; and (3) this
minimum standard ought to be backed up by law.8 9
At a recent symposium, participants predicted that public policy will soon
mandate genetic screening for all pregnant women to encourage abortions of
of motor reactions, inability to sit up or hold her head up, loss of weight, muscle atrophy,
blindness, pseudobulper palsy, inability to feed orally, decerebrate rigidity and gross physical
deformity." Id. at 480.
85. 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980).
86. Id. at 488.
87. The California legislature responded to Curlender by passing CAL. CIv. CODE § 43.6
(West 1992), which "relieves the parents of any liability in this situation and also provides that
the parents' decision shall neither be 'a defense in any action against a third party' nor 'be
considered in awarding damages in any such action.'" Turpin, 643 P.2d at 959. The statute
states:
(a) No cause of action arises against a parent of a child based upon the claim
that the child should not have been conceived or, if conceived, should not have
been allowed to have been born alive.
(b) The failure or refusal of a parent to prevent the live birth of his or her child
shall not be a defense in any action against a third party, nor shall the failure or
refusal be considered in awarding damages in any such action.
(c) As used in this section 'conceived' means the fertilization of a human ovum
by a human sperm.
CAL. CIv. CODE § 43.6 (West 1993). Courts have, however, upheld limitations on the "right
to bear or beget children with an inherited tendency to mental deficiency." In re Cavitt, 157
N.W.2d 171, 175 (Neb. 1968).
88. See, e.g., Bentley Blass, Human Heredity and Ethical Problems, 15 PERSP. IN BIOL-
OGY & MED. 252, 252 (1972) ("Should not the abortion of a seriously defective fetus be
obligatory?").
89. FLETCHER, supra note 7, at 123-24. Fletcher lists retinoblastoma, Tay-Sachs disease




fetuses diagnosed with a disability because "[p]eople do not have a right to
impose those costs on others by ... bearing a child that will need financial
support from society for its care." 90 Theresa Morelli 91 asserts that some
insurance companies are already adopting compulsory abortion policies.
According to Morelli, there are at least two documented cases of insurance
companies requiring abortions of fetuses with disabilities. In one case, the
fetus had cystic fibrosis, and in another the fetus was diagnosed with adult-
onset polycystic kidney disease. "The HMO said, 'If you carry the fetus to
term, we will not pay the child's medical expenses or for your
pregnancy.' "92
B. INFANTS & CHILDREN
The move to eliminate congenital defects by eliminating the person with
the defect has not been limited to the pre-birth arena;93 it has been extended
to infants and children as well. Joseph Fletcher not only advocates compul-
sory abortions to eliminate fetuses with disabilities, he supports active eutha-
nasia, which he characterizes as "postnatal abortion,"' 94 to eliminate what he
terms "sub-human" life - infants with severe disabilities. 95 The now-fa-
mous Baby Doe case illustrates another subjective use of the quality-of-life
concept with regard to infants. Baby Doe was born in April 1982 to an
Indiana couple. He had a malformed esophagus that prevented digestion of
food, a condition which was life-threatening but correctable. He also had
Down's syndrome,96 and the parents, believing he could not live a meaning-
90. Lori B. Andrews, The Randolph W Thrower Symposium: Genetics and the Law, 39
EMORY L.J. 619, 626 (1990) (citing John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and Human Genet-
ics, 39 EMORY L.J. 697 (1990) (emphasis added)). The controversy surrounding Bree Walker
Lampley's second pregnancy further illustrates this trend in the general culture. Mrs. Lam-
pley is a news anchor for a Los Angeles television station. In 1991, her pregnancy was the
subject of a Los Angeles talk show. After stating that Mrs. Lampley had a condition which
caused hand and feet deformities, talk show host Jane Norris posed the evening topic of debate
as follows: "[T]he disease is very possibly going to be passed along to the child that she's about
to have. And our discussion this evening will be, is that a fair thing to do? Is it fair to pass
along a genetically disfiguring disease to your child?" Jay Matthews, The Debate Over Her
Baby; Bree Walker Lampley Has a Deformity. Some People Think She Shouldn't Have Kids,
WASH. POST, Oct. 20, 1991, at Fl.
91. Morelli is a member of the Human Genetics Committee of the Counsel for Responsi-
ble Genetics. Vicki Quade, Protecting the Essence of Being, HUM. RTS., Winter 1993, at 14.
92. Id. at 15.
93. As many commentators have pointed out, disparate treatment of people with disabili-
ties has been expressed since the beginning of history. For a historical overview of infanticide,
see WEIR, supra note 7, at 3-28.
94. FLETCHER, supra note 7 at 144.
95. Id. at 140-48.
96. Baby Doe was diagnosed with esophageal atresia and tracheosophageal fistula. See
Anthony Shaw, Baby Doe and Me, in COMPELLED COMPASSION: GOVERNMENT INTERVEN-
TION IN THE TREATMENT OF CRITICALLY ILL NEWBORNS 185, 193-94 (Arthur L. Caplan et
al. eds., 1992). For a comprehensive history of the Baby Doe Case and resulting federal legis-
lation, see LYON, supra note 7, at 21-58 and Phoebe A. Haddon, Baby Doe Cases: Compromise
and Moral Dilemma, 34 EMORY L.J. 545 (1985). As early as 1973, Doctors Raymond Duff
and A.J.M. Campbell focused national attention on the issue of quality-of-life considerations in
treatment decisionmaking for newborns. The doctors revealed that in the previous two years,
forty-three newborns had died under their "care" after the doctors determined that the
newborns' prognosis for an acceptable quality-of-life was poor due to the presence of congeni-
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ful life, decided not to consent to the necessary medical treatment. Doctors
at the hospital went to court to request judicial approval of nontreatment,
but the legal issues were rendered moot when Baby Doe died.
97
The case received national attention however. As a result, the Child
Abuse Amendments of 198498 and subsequent regulations99 were enacted,
which conditioned federal grants for state child protective services on state
prohibitions against withholding medical treatment from disabled newborns.
The regulations rejected a quality-of-life rationale, and established a stan-
dard which limited nontreatment of infants with disabilities to the following
situations:
(A) the infant is chronically and irreversibly comatose;
(B) the provision of such treatment would-
(i) merely prolong dying;
(ii) not be effective in ameliorating or correcting all of the infant's
life-threatening conditions, or
(iii) otherwise be futile in terms of the survival of the infant; or
(C) the provision of such treatment would be virtually futile in terms of
the survival of the infant and the treatment itself under such circum-
stances would be inhumane. °°
While the enforcement provisions have been criticized by some members of
the medical and legal community, 10 1 the statutory standard offers a viable
tal disorders. Raymond Duff & A.J.M. Campbell, Moral and Ethical Dilemmas in the Special
Care Nursery, 289 NEW ENG. J. MED. 890, 891 (1973). The doctors withheld medical treat-
ment so the infants would die rather than face lives devoid of "meaningful humanhood." In
their report, the doctors called for a move to legitimize such selective treatment. Id. at 892,
894.
97. Shaw, supra note 96, at 193-94.
98. Child Abuse Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-457 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C.A. §§ 5101-5106(h) (West Supp. 1992)).
99. See 50 Fed. Reg. 14877 (1985) (codified at 45 C.F.R. § 1340.15).
100. 45 U.S.C.A. § 5106g. The medical futility debate was illustrated in the Baby L case.
Baby L was born four weeks premature. Although she weighed more than four pounds, there
were grave complications, including severe neurological damage. She was resuscitated and
stabilized but required several surgeries in the first few months of her life, including a gastros-
tomy, a Nissen fundoplication and a tracheostomy. John J. Paris et al., Physcians' Refusal of
Requested Treatment: The Case of Baby L, 322 NEw ENG. J. OF MED. 1012, 1012-13 (1990).
Baby L was discharged from the hospital fourteen months later, she required twenty-four hour
nursing care. Throughout the next two years, she was repeatedly readmitted for complications,
including pneumonia and cardiac arrest. When Baby L was two, her doctors and the hospital
determined that it was in her best interest not to receive any additional medical intervention
and therefore she should no longer be treated. The mother, however, demanded that Baby L
receive all available medical intervention; therefore, a hearing in probate court was required.
In court, the doctors asserted that "since the physicians and hospital believed it would vio-
late their ethical obligation to the patient [to continue medical treatment], they would decline
to participate in [further mechanical ventilation]. Id. at 1013. When this case was reported in
The New England Journal of Medicine, the authors asserted that "the refusal was based on the
team's assessment that unless a reversal or amelioration of the underlying condition would be
expected, painful interventions would be futile and inhumane." Id. Although the case was
dropped when a physician from another facility agreed to treat Baby L, the case raised the
debate over when life becomes unbearable, rendering medical treatment futile, and who is the
most appropriate decision-maker to determine this.
101. See, e.g., Stephen A. Newman, Baby Doe, Congress and the States: Challenging the
Federal Treatment Standard for Impaired Infants, 15 AM. J.L. & MED. 1 (1989) (challenging
state authority to promulgate rules under federal statues as unconstitutional); Kate H. Lind,
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alternative to the current quality-of-life ethic when making treatment deci-
sions for newborns with severe disabilities.
The story of Phillip Becker illustrates that nontreatment decisions based
on disability continue after infancy. Phillip was twelve-years-old when his
public legal battle began in 1979.102 Phillip was a member of a Boy Scout
troop and lived in a board-and-care facility where he had resided since birth.
He had Down's syndrome.103 He also had a congenital heart defect, com-
mon among individuals with Down's syndrome, which required surgery. 104
After repeated unsuccessful attemtps to obtain parental consent for the
surgery, the state brought suit to obtain judicial approval for the operation.
During the initial trial, when asked whether he believed Phillip, "would be
better off dead than alive," Phillip's father, Warren Becker, replied: "Yes, I
think it would be best for everyone."' 0 5 The Beckers also had Dr. Harry B.
Hartzell, pediatrician, testify that
"[b]y his simple and innocent nature, he [Phillip] would be a natural
victim to anyone in the community who might take advantage of him
by his trust or by taking his money .... It is difficult for these individu-
als to fit into modern urban society and, in my experience, they are
isolated and rejected."..... The decision of the parents was "completely
justified," because it was not worth increasing the expectancy "of a life I
consider devoid of those qualities which give it human dignity."' 10 6
Although medical testimony indicated that the surgery would most likely
prolong Phillip's life and failure to perform the surgery would result in pro-
gressive deterioration of Phillip's heart, 10 7 the Santa Clara County Juvenile
Court characterized the operation as "elective" and upheld the parents' de-
nial of treatment.' 08 This decision was overturned, 10 9 but the Beckers suc-
cessfully fought state officials all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court in an
effort to prevent the surgery. 110
In 1981, however, the Heath family, who had developed a long-term rela-
tionship with Phillip, intervened and requested custody of Phillip, in order
to consent to the necessary surgery.' 1' After a twelve-day trial, the court
Note, Medical Treatment Decision-making for Seriously Handicapped Infants: Is There a Role
for the Federal Government?, 24 B.C. L. REV. 714 (1988) (discussing changing role of federal
government in medical treatment decisions); Steven R. Smith, Disabled Newborns and the Fed-
eral Child Abuse Amendments: Tenuous Protection, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 765 (1986) (criticizing
federal statute and regulations as inadequate to sufficiently influence decision making).
102. In re Philip B., 156 Cal. Rptr. 48 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 49 (1980); Pamela
Abramson, Who Speaks for the Child?, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 3, 1979, at 49.
103. Id.
104. Id.; see In re Phillip B., 156 Cal. Rptr. at 49.
105. See Abramson, supra note 102.
106. Lou Cannon, A New "Right-to-Life" Battleground Opens Over Mentally Retarded
Child, WASH. POST, July 15, 1979, at A3 (alternation in original).
107. Id.
108. See Abramson, supra note 102.
109. In re Phillip B., 156 Cal. Rptr. 48 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 49.
110. Id. A Life Worth Living, UPI, August 8, 1981, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
UPI File.
S111. See Herbert & Patsy H. v. Warren B., 188 Cal. Rptr. 781 (1980); see also Parents Bar
Surgery and Lose Son's Custody, UPI, Aug. 9, 1981, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI
File. Herbert and Patsy Heath met Phillip in 1972 while volunteering at his board and care
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found that the Heath family should be permitted to consent to the sur-
gery,11 2 declaring that they were Phillip's "psychological parents."1 1 3 The
Beckers unsuccessfully appealed the court's decision. The families settled in
1983, however, and Phillip finally received the necessary surgery.11 4
The previous narrative was intended to highlight the real-life effect of
quality-of-life determinations on newborns and children with disabilities.
The infants and children discussed were not brain dead, were not in a persis-
tive vegetative state, and were not in a coma. Instead they had disabilities of
varying degrees. Their stories demonstrate that quality-of-life formulas and
predictions are, in reality, justifications to deny medically indicated treat-
ment for children considered unworthy of life.
C. ADULTS WITH DISABILITIES
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Representative Walker Sackett, M.D.,
introduced several "Death with Dignity" bills in the Florida state legisla-
ture. 1 1 5 These bills permitted discontinuing medical treatment of a patient if
the treatment was designed "solely to sustain life." 11 6 Sackett proposed to
apply the bills to euthanize ninety-percent of the state's institutionalized resi-
dents, "primarily on the ground that they lead meaningless lives." '1 1 7
facility and had maintained a relationship with him through the years. Spencer Sherman,
Court Asked to Halt Surgery on Retarded Child, UPI, Aug. 31, 1981, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, UPI File. They provided him tutors, enrolled him in Boy Scouts, and invited
him home for weekends. UPI, Parents Bar Surgery and Lose Son's Custody, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
9, 1981 at 21.
112. Herbert & Patsy H. v. Warren B., 188 Cal. Rptr. at 783. The court characterized the
Heaths as Phillip's "psychological parents", noting their long-term relationship with Phillip as
well as their desire to adopt him. The court also noted that Phillip "suffered harm by the
parenting of the Beckers" and that he could "never receive any benefit from custody with the
Beckers because they have no expectations for him and will therefore do nothing to allow him
to win a place in our society." Id.; see George Will, A Trip Towards Death, NEWSWEEK, Aug.
31, 1981, at 72.
113. The Beckers, however, successfully appealed to the state supreme court, which again
halted the proceedings and necessary surgery. On appeal, the state court of appeals affirmed
the lower court holding permitting consent without ruling on whether custody was properly
granted. See Foster Parents Granted Decision Making Power Over Retarded Boy, UPI, Oct. 20,
1981, available in LEXIS. Nexis Library, UPI File. In early 1983, the state court of appeals
officially granted custody to the Heaths and the Becker's appeal to the supreme court was
subsequently turned aside. UPI, Apr. 28, 1983, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI file.
The families then settled privately. See Robert Lindsey, Surgery Follows Pact on Custody:
Down's Syndrome Boy's Case Strengthens Rights of Handicapped, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 1983,
at 1.
114. Id.
115. See DEREK HUMPHREY & ANN WICKETT, THE RIGHT TO DIE: UNDERSTANDING
EUTHANASIA, 88, 95 (1990).
116. See Doctors Divided Over Euthanasia; Physicians Testify Before Senate Panel on Aging,
N.Y. TIMES Aug. 8, 1972, at 15.
117. These bills would have directed euthanasia of approximately 1500 institutionalized
residents. See Evelyn W. Lusthaus, Involuntary Euthanasia and Current Attempts to Define
Persons with Mental Retardation as Less Than Human, 25 MENTAL RETARDATION 148, 152
(1985). According to the National Institute on Mental Retardation, twenty-nine other states
were considering bills at that time which would have legalized euthanasia of children and
adults with mental retardation. NAT'L INST. ON MENTAL RETARDATION, ORIENTATION




Fortunately, the bill did not become law. An examination into recent
court cases, however, reveals a growing number of people with disabilities
are "qualify[ing]" for such elimination, on the basis that their lives lack
meaning or quality. This section examines several recent cases affecting peo-
ple with disabilities to demonstrate the trend of justifying death by using
quality-of-life language. These cases generally involve two different scena-
rios. In one situation, a severely physically disabled person asserts his right
as a competent' 18 adult to refuse life-sustaining treatment. In the other situ-
ation, a family member or hospital requests court permission to withhold or
withdraw life-sustaining treatment from a person with severe mental disabil-
ities. 1I9 In both situations, nontreatment or discontinuation of treatment is
based on the premise that the individuals' disabilities have diminished the
quality of their lives to the point that death is preferable to life.
1. Competent Adults with Disabilities
When adults with severe disabilities assert their right as competent adults
to refuse medical treatment, courts will generally apply a balancing test,
weighing the individual and state interests. 120 The individual's interests are
self-determination and the right to refuse medical treatment. 121 The state's
interests are generally comprised of four elements: (1) preserving the sanc-
tity of life; (2) preventing suicide; (3) protecting innocent third persons; and
(4) preserving the integrity of the medical profession.122 At least one court
has added a fifth element: encouraging humane care of people with disabili-
ties requiring life-sustaining treatment.1 23
118. Establishing and implementing appropriate guidelines for determining competency is
a very difficult task "The search for a unitary test of competency is, in the words of Dr. Loren
Roth, a 'search for a Holy Grail.'" Michael L. Perlin, Competency Deinstitutionalization and
Homelessness: A Story of Marginalization, 28 Hous. L. REV. 63, 113 (1991), (quoting Loren H.
Roth, et al., Tests of Competency to Consent to Treatment 134 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 279, 283
(1977) (discussing five basic types of competency tests including: "1) evidencing a choice, 2)
"reasonable" outcome of choice, 3) choice based on "rational" reasons, 4) ability to under-
stand and 5) actual understanding")). See also 1 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF
ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, MAKING HEALTH
CARE DECISIONS 47 (1982) (asserting that "any determination of the capacity to decide on a
course of treatment must related to the individual abilities of a patient the requirement of the
tasks at hand and the consequences likely to flow from the decision"). According to the Com-
mission, capacity for decisionmaking requires that the individual have a set of values, the
ability to comprehend and communicate information and the ability to "reason and to deliber-
ate about one's choices."
119. See infra notes 157-86.
120. See In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 667-63 (N.J.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976)
(holding that state interests of preservation of life and maintenance of the integrity of the
medical profession must be weighed against the individual's right of privacy found in the Four-
teenth Amendment).
121. See Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 277 (1990) (holding
that the individual's right to refuse medical treatment is founded in fourteenth amendment
liberty interest).
122. See Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 425
(Mass. 1977); McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617, 621-22 (Nev. 1990); cf In re Guardianship
of Browning, 543 So. 2d 266 n. 1 (Fla. Dist Ct. App. 1989) (suggesting that additional state
interests could be considered).
123. McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d at 621-22.
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The first major case to address the right to die for a competent adult with
severe physical disabilities was Bouvia v. Superior Court.'24 Elizabeth
Bouvia, a twenty-eight year-old college educated woman with severe cere-
bral palsy, filed a petition requesting injunction to force doctors to remove
her feeding tube. 125 In the three years preceding her suit, Ms. Bouvia suf-
fered tremendous personal loss. After entering graduate school, her dean
informed her that regardless of her academic success, she could not expect
job placement.' 26 Her placement office informed her that if the university
had known of her severe disabilities, they would not have accepted her into
the graduate program in the first place.' 27 When she dropped out of school,
the state of California repossessed her accessible van.' 28 She also needed
surgery to relieve severe spasticity in her arms, but MediCal refused to pro-
vide the necessary funding. 29 Shortly after these events, she miscarried her
child and her husband left her. Although she had temporarily moved in
with her father, she was forced to find alternative housing because her father
could not provide adequate care.130
After many unsuccessful attempts to find a residence with suitable per-
sonal assistive services, she checked into a public hospital and requested to
die. A trial court refused to grant permission, and her friends assisted her in
finding other temporary housing. Her continued attempts to find a perma-
nent independent living situation were unsuccessful, however, and she re-
turned to a hospital intending to starve herself to death. Her attempts to die
were again thwarted when doctors inserted a feeding tube to provide her
with necessary nutritional support. She petitioned the court, requesting an
order to remove the tube and to enjoin the doctors from additional attempts
to maintain her life. 13
The trial court again denied her request, but this ruling was overturned by
the appellate court.' 3 2 The appellate court justified its reversal by determin-
ing that Bouvia's life was devoid of any quality. 3 3 It defined her life in
incredibly negative terms and presented her request as entirely rational in
light of her physical condition.134 The court sympathetically asked: "Can
anyone blame her if she wants to fold her cards and say 'I'm out'?"' 35
The recent life stresses Bouvia experienced would, in any other case, cause
a court to characterize her request as a suicide request, triggered by suicidal
124. 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
125. Id.
126. Mary Jane Owen, The Goose Girl, THE DISABILITY RAG, Feb./Mar. 1984, at 1.
127. Missing Pieces, THE DISABILITY RAG, Feb./Mar. 1984 6, at 6.
128. Owen, supra note 126, at 4.
129. Missing Pieces, supra note 127, at 5-6. MediCal ruled that the surgery was experimen-
tal. Id.
130. Owen, supra note 126, at 1.
131. Id.
132. Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
133. Id. at 305.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 307.
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depression. Yet, the court failed to consider these life-shattering events; it
was too intently focused on her physical condition and lack of independence.
Petitioner's physical handicaps of palsy and quadriplegia have
progressed to the point where she is completely bedridden. Except for a
few fingers of one hand and some slight head and facial movements, she
is immobile. She is physically helpless and wholly unable to care for
herself. She is totally dependent upon others for all of her needs....
Here, if force fed petitioner would have to be fed, cleaned, turned, bed-
ded, toileted by others for 15 to 20 years! ... Although alert, bright,
sensitive, perhaps even brave and feisty, she must lie physically helpless
subject to the ignominy, embarrassment, humiliation and dehumanizing
aspects created by her helplessness .... We cannot conceive it to be the
policy of this State to inflict such an ordeal upon anyone.' 36
Based on this assessment of the quality of Bouvia's life, the court granted her
petition and ordered the trial court to grant the requested injunction. 37 The
court, in finding for Bouvia, clearly considered her life as totally lacking an
acceptable quality-of-life. Rather than focus on the fact that Bouvia checked
into the hospital after three years of incredible emotional stress caused at
least in part, by her homelessness, the court focused solely on her severe
physical disabilities and her dependence on others to find that her life was
just not worth living. 138
Kenneth McKay's life (and death) demonstrates that other courts have
displayed a similarly distorted view of people with severe physical disabili-
ties. McKay became paralyzed in a swimming accident when he was ten.
Due to his quadriplegia, McKay was dependent on a ventilator and required
personal assistive services. He had continuously resided with his father since
the accident. When McKay was thirty-one, his father became terminally ill.
McKay petitioned the court for an order directing the removal of his ventila-
tor. The trial court granted his request and the Nevada Supreme Court
affirmed. 139
The supreme court classified McKay as a non-terminal, competent
adult, 140 and balanced his right to refuse medical treatment against the
state's interests. The court re-framed McKay's interest in the right to refuse
medical treatment' 4' as "the interest ... in determining the extent to which
136. Id. 299, 305 (emphasis added).
137. Id. at 307. Now thirty-five, Bouvia lives in the Los Angeles County-USC Medical
Center. She continues to assert her desire to die, but fears that the process of starvation will be
too painful. " 'I've never changed my mind but it's kind of a Catch-22 situation.' Now that
she has the right to starve herself to death she says, she couldn't stand the pain and 'it's not
like the doctors are going to help me.'" Beverly Heyette, The Reluctant Survivor: 9 Years
After Helping Her Fight to the Right to Die, Elizabeth Bouvia's Lawyer and Confidante Killed
Himself- Leaving Her Shaken and Living the Life She Dreaded, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1992,
at E2. She states, however, that her physical condition has improved and her pain is managed
with morphine. Id.
138. Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 138.
139. McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617 (Nev. 1990). McKay died before the opinion was
written but the court retained the case because it addressed an important public issue. Id.
140. Id. at 620
141. Id. at 621. "[W]e do agree with the United States Supreme Court... that a person's
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he... is willing to have a devastated life continued artificially or by radical
medical treatment."' 14 2 The court then considered the state's interests. (1)
preserving the sanctity of life; (2) preventing suicide; (3) protecting innocent
third persons who could be adversely affected by the individual's death; (4)
preserving the integrity of the medical profession; and (5) encouraing chari-
table and humane care of people with disabilities requiring life-sustaining
treatment. 143
According to the court, the state's fundamental and compelling interest in
preserving life depreciates as the individual's quality-of-life diminishes:
[A]t some point in the life of a competent adult patient, the present or
prospective quality of life may be so dismal that the right of the individ-
ual to refuse treatment or elect a discontinuance of artificial life support
must prevail over the interest of the State in preserving life .... We
therefore conclude that in situations involving adults who are: (1) com-
petent; (2) irreversibly sustained or subject to being sustained by artifi-
cial life support systems or some form of heroic, radical medical
treatment, and (3) enduring physical and mental pain and suffering, the
individual's right to decide will generally outweigh the State's interest
in preserving life. 144
The court held that McKay fell within that situation. Even though he had
completed school, could operate a computer and wheelchair on a limited
basis, and otherwise live "a useful and productive life," this was deemed
insignificant in light of his quadriplegia, which required the use of a ventila-
tor and personal assistive services. 145
Several aspects of this decision are troubling. While McKay met the first
criteria, he arguably did not meet the other ones. The ventilator, character-
ized as radical treatment, had been in place for over twenty years, since the
accident. Characterizing such supports as radical justifies a diminished in-
terest in the lives of many people with disabilities, especially people with
severe disabilities. Supports such as wheelchairs, electronic monitoring de-
vices, shunts, and ventilators are necessary to the lives of many disabled
people and should hardly be considered radical or heroic. 146 McKay argua-
bly failed to meet the third requirement also. While he appeared to be suffer-
ing much mental pain, evidence strongly indicated that his suffering was due
in large part to his fear that he would not receive adequate personal assistive
support after his father died. The court recognized that "fear of the un-
known is a common travail even among those of us who are not imprisoned
by paralysis and a total dependency upon others," 147 and admitted that pro-
liberty interest is fundamental constitutional value implicated in 'right to die' cases." Id. (cit-
ing Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 277 (1990)).
142. McKay, 801 P.2d at 1621. Although the court initially described McKay as
"nonterminal," it justified its articulation of his individual interest "[b]ecause many individuals
find themselves facing a terminal condition susceptible to indefinite suspension by medical
intervention." Id. (emphasis added).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 622-24.
145. Id.
146. McKay, 801 P.2d at 634-35 (J. Springer, dissenting).
147. Id. at 624.
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viding humane care is a vital state interest. 48 Surely the state's interest in
McKay's life should have been aimed at relieving the problems caused by
inadequate personal assistive care for him (and other people with disabili-
ties), rather than justifying his fears. Instead, the court held McKay's deci-
sion was rational in light of his disabilities (and, presumably, the state's
inadequate support services).
The state's second interest, preventing suicide, was similarly dismissed.
The court acknowledged that McKay was requesting the right to affirma-
tively hasten his death and that had McKay not been disabled, his liberty
interest would not outweigh the state's interest: "Our societal regard for the
value of an individual life ... would never countenance an assertion of lib-
erty over life under such circumstances."1 49 The court then justified a di-
minished "regard for the value of" McKay's life by examining his motive, in
light of his physical condition. According to the court, the motives behind a
person's request to die should be considered in light of their quality-of-life.
"If a competent adult is beset with an irreversible condition such as
quadriplegia, where life must be sustained artificially and under circum-
stances of total dependence, the adult's attitude or motive may be presumed
not to be suicidaL " 0 In other words, the desire to die is entirely rational for
a person with severe physical disabilities. McKay did not want to commit
suicide; he merely wanted to be freed from his "paralytic prison from which
there was no hope of release other than death."' 51 The state's duty to pre-
serve the integrity of the medical profession and to prevent "selective de-
struction of lives deemed to have little utility' ' 152 was not at issue because,
according to the court, nontreatment is justified when treatment "will do
little or nothing more than delay death in a bodily environment essentially
bereft of quality."' 1 3
The state's interest in encouraging appropriate support services for per-
sons with disabilities, which offered the most hope for McKay, was barely
given lip service. In a very disturbing observation, the court seemed to rec-
ognize that societal factors were the culprit causing McKay's diminished
quality-of-life when it noted that McKay
was not without a meaningful life. His ability to give expression to his
intellect by means of an orally operated computer, to learn, to enjoy
reading ... all reflected the possibility of a life imbued with a potential
for significant quality and accomplishment .... [McKay] needed some
type of assurance that society would not cast him adrift in a sea of indif-
ference after his father's passing."' 54
How then, one must ask, could the court uphold his right to die rather than
asserting his right to a minimal quality of life? Instead, the court merely
148. Id.
149. Id. at 625 (emphasis added).
150. McKay, 801 P.2d at at 627 (emphasis added).
151. Id. at 626.
152. Id. at 626-27.
153. Id. at 628. The court also dismissed the third interest protecting innocent third par-
ties because McKay had no dependents. Id. at 626.
154. Id. at 628.
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held that this interest required the state to inform the disabled person of the
avialable services provided by the government and other service organiza-
tions before he is permitted to kill himself. 155
The judicial reaction to both McKay and Bouvia because of their disabili-
ties demonstrates how the new quality-of-life ethic devalues and excludes
people with physical disabilities by concurring with them that death is better
than life with severe disabilities, rather than by seeking to alleviate the pres-
sures which make live with such disabilities so difficult. 156
2. Incompetent Adults with Disabilities 157
When an adult cannot and has never been able to communicate her
wishes, courts generally use either the substituted judgment test or the best
interests test. The substituted judgment test purports to focus on what the
person would request were she able to communicate her preferences. 5 8 The
best interest standard attempts to determine what course of action will be
most beneficial to the individual.' 59 Although courts frequently deny it,
each standard incorporates the quality-of-life ethic into its decision-making
process.
The first right-to-die case articulating the substituted judgment test was
Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz.160 Joseph
Saikewicz, sixty-seven, had been institutionalized since childhood. He was
physically healthy but unable to communicate verbally and was labeled se-
verely mentally retarded. In 1976, doctors diagnosed him with acute my-
eloblastic monocytic leukemia, which was potentially curable with
chemotherapy. Doctors, however, decided not to treat Saikewicz, and re-
155. Id. at 627. The court set up procedural guidelines for future cases where competent
persons wish to exercise their right to refuse or withdraw medical treatment: (1) Two physi-
cians besides the attending physician, must examine the person. They must certify in writing
that: (a) he is mentally competent and understands the medical treatment options available
and the consequences of not choosing the treatment options; (b) his condition is irreversible, or
what improvements can reasonably be expected with medical treatment; (c) he is making the
decision of his own free will; (d) if he is not terminal (i.e., will live more than six months), that
he was informed of all the care options available through governmental and private services
which could increase his quality of life.
If the preceding steps are taken and the person is terminally ill, his right to self-determina-
tion must be considered greater than the state interest and he may refuse or withdraw medical
treatment. A physician who assists him in his attempt to end his life will be immune from civil
and criminal liability. If the person is not terminally ill, a district court judge must balance his
interests with the state interest. If the judge finds that the person's rights outweigh the state's
interest, her determination will be final. If she determines that state interests override the
person's interests, her decision is subject to appeal. In other words, a presumption in favor of
permitting death has been established. If the person's right to die is sustained, an assisting
physician will be immune from civil and criminal liability. Id. at 630.
156. See infra notes 238-45 and accompanying text.
157. "Incompetent" as used in this section refers to the legal determination that a person
lacks the mental capacity to make informed medical decisions. See sources cited supra note
118.
158. Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 431 (Mass.
1977). The decisions other people would make regarding treatment in a particular situation
should have no direct bearing on the choice made for the individual in question.
159. In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1232 (N.J. 1985).
160. 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977).
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quested judicial approval of their decision. 61
The trial court approved and the state supreme court affirmed its deci-
sion.162 According to the supreme court, the appropriate procedure to
maintain integrity of a person determined incompetent is to ascertain what
the individual would want.' 63
[T]he decision in cases such as this should be that which would be made
by the incompetent person, if that person were competent, but taking
into account the present and future incompetency of the individual as
one of the factors which would necessarily enter into the decision-mak-
ing process of the competent person. 64
Although the court recognized that no one could possibly determine what
treatments Saikewicz would desire because he had never been able to express
his wishes, it held that a surrogate could assert his (unknown) desires for
him.' 65 When the surrogate requested nontreatment, the court agreed,
claiming its decision was based "on a regard for [Saikewicz's] actual ...
preferences."1 6
6
Despite protests to the contrary, 6 7 the Saikewicz analysis was indeed
based on quality-of-life considerations. As in the cases of Elizabeth
Bouvia 168 and Kenneth McKay,169 Saikewicz's life was described in negative
terms with heavy emphasis on his alleged severe retardation. 170 The court
161. An appointed guardian ad litem concluded that in light of his mental retardation,
which would presumably make him unable to understand what was going on, and the uncer-
tain benefits, nontreatment was appropriate. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 419.
162. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 420. The trial court based its decision on a balancing test,
weighing the benefits and burdens of the proposed treatment. According to the court, the
benefits of the treatment were the possibility of lengthened life and that most people with his
condition would desire the treatment. The burdens of the treatment included his age, his
expected inability to cooperate, expected adverse side effects of chemotherapy, uncertain bene-
fit of chemotherapy and the undesirable quality of his life even if chemotherapy was successful.
Id.
163. Id. at 430, (citing John A. Robertson, Organ Donations by Incompetents and the Sub-
stituted Judgment Doctrine, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 48, 63 (1976)).
164. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 431.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 432. The court held: "[flinding no State interest sufficient to counterbalance a
patient's decision to decline life-prolonging medical treatment in the circumstances of this
case, we conclude that the patient's right to privacy and self-determination is entitled to en-
forcement." Id. at 435. Saikewicz and the substituted judgment standard has been severely
criticized but is nevertheless still used. See Steven M. Richard, Someone Make Up My Mind:
The Troubling Right to Die Issues Presented by Incompetent Patients With no Prior Expression
of a Treatment Preference, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 394 (1989) (rejecting standard because it
permits the surrogate decision-maker to infuse personal prejedices); William A. Krais, Com-
ment, The Incompetent Developmentally Disabled Person's Right-to-Die Sterilization and Insti-
tutionalization, 15 AM. J.L. & MED. 333 (1989) (rejecting standard because inter alia, it does
not provide adequate accountability).
167. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 431. The court asserted that "the chance of a longer life
carries the same weight for Saikewicz as for any other person, the value of life under the law
having no relation to intelligence of social position." Id. "To the extent that this formulation
equates the value of life with any measure of the quality of life, we firmly reject it." Id. at 432.
168. Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1986). See supra notes 124-38 and
accompanying text for discussion of this case.
169. McKay v. Bergsedt, 801 P.2d 617 (Nev. 1990). See supra notes 139-55 and accompa-
nying text for discussion of this case.
170. As discussed previously, many people are inaccurately labelled mentally retarded. In-
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explicitly required the decision-maker to take Saikewicz's mental ability into
account when determining appropriate treatment. The primary reason for
refusing treatment was that Saikewicz would not be able to comprehend
what was happening to him, and would suffer short-term physical pain. 171
Yet most courts would not consider nontreatment on this basis in the case of
a small child who needed the treatment but was too immature to understand
or cooperate.1 72
The best interest test, on the other hand, focuses on which treatment alter-
native will provide the most benefit for the individual. 17 3 Courts have ar-
ticulated the best interest standard in a variety of ways. In In re Conroy 174
the New Jersey Supreme Court established two tests. When the individual is
incompetent and has never indicated her personal preference, the "pure-ob-
jective" test applies: Whether the burdens of continued existence "clearly
and markedly" outweigh any benefits of life and continued treatment will
result in "recurring, unavoidable and severe pain such that the effect of ad-
ministering life-sustaining treatment would be inhumane." 175 When evi-
dence that the individual would have refused treatment exists, such as
declarations made while the person was competent, the "limited-objective"
test applies: Whether the burdens of the person's continued life "markedly
outweigh any physical pleasure, emotional enjoyment, or intellectual satis-
faction that the patient may still be able to derive from life."' 76 The court
expressly denied that it was following a quality-of-life ethic,177 yet stated
that decision-makers should consider "level of functioning, [and] degree of
humiliation and dependency" when making the treatment decision. 178 Each
of these elements requires an analysis based on the quality-of-life ethic.
creasingly, as technology advances, we are discovering more and more people inaccurately
labelled severely retarded who in fact were only unable to communicate through traditional
means. See supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text.
171. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 421, 431.
172. The court apparently failed to consider whether sedatives or other calming techniques
could be used, techniques which would almost certainly be utilized with a child. See Ira Mark
Ellman, Cruzan v. Harmon and the Dangerous Claim that Others Can Exercise an Incapaci-
tated Patient's Right to Die, 29 JURIMETRICS J., 389, 397 (1989).
173. See William A. Krais, Note, The Incompetent Developmentally Disabled Person's
Right to Self-Determination: Right-To-Die, Sterilzation and Institutionalization, 15 AM. J.L. &
MED. 333, 349 (1989).
174. 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985).
175. Id. at 1232.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 1232-33. The court stated:
[W]e expressly decline to authorize decision-making based on assessments of the
personal worth or social utility of another's life, or the value of that life to
others. We do not believe that it would be appropriate for a court to designate a
person with the authority to determine that someone else's life is not worth
living because, to that person, the patient's "quality of life" or value to society
seems negligible.
Id. The court limited its holding to cases involving elderly, incompetent residents of nursing
homes with severe mental or physical disabilities and life expectancies of less than one year.
Id. at 1230.
178. Id. at 1232. The court held that life expectancy prognosis, and treatment alternatives
should also be taken into account. Id.
1992]
SMU LAW REVIEW
There are several other formulations. A New York court 179 established
twelve factors to determine the best interests of an incompetent individual,
including age, degree of pain and suffering, degree of disability and depen-
dency, quality of life,180 views of the individual's family members and physi-
cian, and type of care required if life is prolonged.' 8 ' In 1983, the
President's Commission on the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and
Biomedical and Behavioral Research (President's Commission), also ex-
pressly advocated using the quality-of-life ethic to determine the best inter-
ests of the individual.'8 2 According to the President's Commission, the
decision-maker should consider "such factors as the relief of suffering, the
preservation or restoration of function, and the quality as well as the extent
of life sustained."18 3
All of these standards, therefore, expressly or implicitly devalue a person's
life on the basis of mental disability or physical dependency. If the decision-
maker determines that life with severe mental disabilities is undesirable, or
that being physically dependent is undesirable, nontreatment can be justi-
fied.' 84 In light of the historical devaluation of severely disabled person's
lives' 85 and increasing awareness of the possibility of inaccurate assess-
ments,18 6 reliance on level of mental ability is especially dangerous.
III. QUALITY-OF-LIFE AND OTHER DECISION-MAKING
MODELS
Part II examined how the judicial application of the quality-of-life ethic
invariably leads to detrimental decisions regarding the lives of severely dis-
abled persons. There are other decision-making models which give rise to
the same concerns. This section will address how parents, doctors, and hos-
pital ethics committees can also succumb to the quality-of-life ethic when
making treatment decisions.
179. In re Beth Israel Medical Center, 519 N.Y.S.2d 511, 517 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987).
180. The court defined quality of life as the "extent, if any, of pleasure, emotional enjoy-
ment, or intellectual satisfaction." Id.
181. Id. Other factors were life expectency, risks of treatment, previous preference, the
individual's religious views, and whether the state has any overriding interest in sustaining life.
Id.
182. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND
BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FORGO LIFE SUSTAINING TREAT-
MENT: ETHICAL, MEDICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES IN TREATMENT DECISIONS 134 (1983).
183. Id. at 135. The commission also advocates considering what impact the decision will
have on the individual's family. Id. at 136.
184. Leval of functioning, degree of humiliation and dependency are factors under In re
Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1232 (N.J. 1985). Degree of disability and dependency and extent of
intellectual satisfaction are factors under In re Beth Israel Medical Center, 519 N.Y.S.2d at
517.
185. See Gerry & McWhorter, supra note 26, at 496 (asserting that United States policy
towards people with severe disabilities has historically been based on three principles: dehu-
manization, inferior social and legal status and mandatory segregation). For an extensive dis-
course on disability discrimination imbedded in our society and legal system, see MARTHA
MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE, INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION AND AMERICAN
LAW (1990).
186. See supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text.
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When an individual is a minor or considered incompetent,18 7 a presump-
tion generally exists that the family should make treatment decisions for the
individual. 88 Family members presumably know the individual best and
will be most protective of the individual's interests. In the case of minors,
parental autonomy is a fundamental right, protected by the privacy right
found in the Fourteenth Amendment.18 9 "[T]he custody, care and nurture of
the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom
include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hin-
der." 90 There are several dangers, however, in relying solely on parental
decisions. Parents are just as susceptable to the quality-of-life ethic. In the
case of newborns, the shock and grief of an unexpected serious disability can
affect parents' competence to make appropriate decisions. Parents may be
extremely susceptible to external pressures and may not understand much of
the medical information provided to them in a crisis situation.19' Parents
may experience a conflict of interest between their desires and the best inter-
ests of the child. They may have internal biases concerning disabled people
resulting from previous personal experiences.' 92 Therefore, parental auton-
omy cannot be absolute. 19 3
Doctors are arguably best equipped to understand medical treatment and
medical implications of a disability. Thus, their participation in the deci-
sion-making process is invaluable; however, serious difficulties arise with
physicians assuming the prominent role in the decision-making process.
Doctor recommendations are too often clouded by their own negative atti-
tude towards disabled people. There are countless cases where doctors have
made dire predictions concerning newborns which turned out to be com-
pletely inaccurate. For example, doctors diagnosed Sondra Diamond with
187. See supra note 157 for definition of incompetent.
188. See BUCHANAN & BROCK, supra note 11, at 136.
189. See United States v. Orita, 413 U.S. 139, 142 (1973) (privacy right includes right of
marriage, procreation, motherhood, child rearing, and education); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205, 232 (1972) (privacy right protects parental right to determine child's religious up-
bringing); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (liberty of parents to direct
education of children); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (liberty of parents to raise
child).
190. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). This right, however, is not abso-
lute. In the case of minors, the state has a duty, as patens patriae, to protect children, and may
intervene in family decisions in order to protect the child's health. In re Phillip B., 156 Cal.
Rptr. 48, 50 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 49 (1980).
191. See Siegfried M. Pueschel, Ethical Considerations in the Life of a Child with Downs
Syndrome, 5 ISSUES IN LAW & MED. 87, 94 (1989); see also infra notes 195-99 (discussing how
physicians may present diagnosis to advance their treatment recommendations).
192. See Robyn S. Shapiro & Richard Barthel, Infant Care Review Committees: An Effec-
tive Approach to the Baby Doe Dilemma?, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 827, 835 (1986).
193. Courts have set forth several elements to consider in judicial review of parental deci-
sions regarding treatment of a child including the severity of harm the child is currently suffer-
ing or will suffer, the medical evaluation of the proposed treatment, the risks of the treatment
and, if possible, the child's expressed preferences. See In re Phillip B., 156 Cal. Rptr. 48, 50
(1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 49 (1980). "Of course, the underlying consideration is the child's
welfare and whether his best interests will be served by the medical treatment." Id.; see also,
Martha Minow, Beyond State Intervention in the Family: For Baby Jane Doe, 18 U. MICH. J.
L. REF. 993 (1985) (discussing tensions between family privacy and state intervention and
offereing a constructive framework for resolving the conflicts).
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cerebral palsy at birth, and predicted that she had little or no chance of
achieving any type of meaningful life. She successfully attended college.194
When Sondra suffered serious burns as an adult, doctors recommended non-
treatment on the basis of their perception of her severe disability which pre-
vented "normal" life. She had to fight to receive neccessary medical
treatment. 195 The Oklahoma Experiment 196 also illustrates the danger
posed when physicians present information to parents in order to advance
the physicians' recommendations. There, Dr. Gross, lead physician, ac-
knowledged that newborns "considered to have a poor prognosis have a sur-
vival equal to that of babies with a good prognosis, if they receive early
surgical treatment" yet the doctors presented prognoses in ways which ad-
vanced their recommended outcomes.19 7 The Indiana Baby Doe case pro-
vides yet another illustration. Dr. Walter Owens, Baby Doe's attending
physician, explained that his personal experience with a disabled child
strongly influenced his recommendation not to treat Baby Doe. His
nephew's child was born with a birth defect, presumably Down's Syndrome,
and required major surgery. Dr. Owens described this child: "It learned to
walk at the age of four, and it has never learned to talk .... Obviously, this
has colored my thinking on the survival of such children. I believe there are
things that are worse than having a child die. And one of them is that it
might live." 198
Hospital ethics committees have been offered as a mechanism to facilitate
medical treatment decisions. 199 Ethics committees can serve several func-
tions. They can provide education on biothethical issues and be a forum for
arbitrating disputes concerning care. Further, if properly composed of an
interdisciplinary team, they can serve to facilitate principled medical deci-
sion-making. 2°° History demonstrates, however, that ethics committees are
194. See "I Am Not What You See," A Film Dialogue Between Sandra Diamond and Roy
Bonisteel, reprinted in Judith Areen et al., LAW, SCIENCE, & MEDICINE 1199, 1202 (1984).
195. Id.
196. See Early Management, supra note 68. Even when prognoses are not purposely
slanted, the potential for inaccurate prognoses is most acute in the case of newborns and young
children with disabilities. Intellectual capacity is highly unpredictable in the first stages of life.
Further, it is virtually impossible to accurately predict the long-term benefits of medical treat-
ment given to babies born with disabilities.
197. See Gross, Newborns, supra note 68, at 1633.
198. LYON, supra note 7, at 27. The Royal Dutch Society recently called for the use of an
"unlivable life" prognosis, based on the doctor's personal experience, intuition, and available
statistics relating to the specific condition of the child. The society defends withholding of
treatment and active killing of a child who receives an unlivable life prognosis. In cases of
uncertain prognosis, the report recommends that doctors keep the patient alive "provided that
the ... physician is willing to forgo life-supporting measures and possibly terminate the pa-
tient's life if the final prognosis appears to be an 'unlivable life'." Report of The Royal Dutch
Society of Medicine on "Life-Termination Actions with Incompetent Patients, Part I.- Severely
Handicapped Newborns, 7 ISSUES IN LAW & MED. 365, 366 (1991).
199. See BUCHANAN & BROCK, supra note 11 at 148. For an in-depth look into the exper-
iences of one hospital's ethics committee, see Shapiro & Barthel, supra note 185. See also
sources cited at supra note 103 (discussing benefits and dangers of ethics committees).
200. Id. at 149.
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no guarantor of safety for people with disabilities. 201 During the eugenics
movement in the early 1900s, ethics committees were established to regulate
sterilization of people with disabilities provided scant protection. Similarly,
in pre-World War II Germany, ethics committees required to review eutha-
nasia cases invariably recommended death for disabled people. 20 2
A more recent situation, set forth in In re Jane Doe,20 3 demonstrates how
hospital committees may attempt to coerce a nontreatment decision over
family objections. Jane Doe was diagnosed with an unknown neurological
degenerative disorder at thirteen.2°  Her condition was described as vacillat-
ing between a deep stupor and a slight coma. The treating hospital, asserting
that continued medical treatment constituted medical abuse, petitioned the
court to authorize withdrawal of life-support systems against the wishes of
the teenager's father. 20 5 Therefore, even ethics committees are prone to fol-
low the quality-of-life ethic which has such a negative impact on disabled
people.
IV. DILEMMAS WITH DIAGNOSES & DEFINITIONS
As the previous sections illustrated, when courts, parents, doctors, or hos-
pital ethics committees apply the quality-of-life ethic, their negative attitudes
towards people with severe disabilities too often result in decisions to forego
or withdraw necessary medcial treatment. This section will illustrate the
problems with flawed medical diagnoses, which render quality-of-life deter-
minations based on these diagnoses especially problematic. Compounding
this problem, definitions are easy to manipulate. By redefining disease, disa-
bility, treatment and personhood based on the quality-of-life ethic, courts
and other decisionmakers can too easily justify their decisions to permit the
nontreatment - death - of persons with severe disabilities.
A. UNCERTAIN DIAGNOSES
Many of the court cases applying the quality-of-life ethic have involved
individuals diagnosed as being in a persistent vegetative state (PVS). PVS is
generally accepted as permanent, and decisions to provide or withhold treat-
ment are often based on this diagnosis.20 6 Yet there are a number of cases
201. See GALLAGHER, supra note 7, at 82-84. Thirty states had legislation establishing
sterilization procedures for the "feebleminded and the hereditarily unfit." Id. at 82.
202. Id. at 56. See also Marker et al., supra note 2, Marker's article provides an interesting
historical comparison between the eugenics and right to die movement in pre-World War II
Germany and present day America.
203. In re Jane Doe, (Court Order, Civil Action No., D-93064 (Oct. 17, 1991), quoted in
Verbatim, 7 ISSUES IN LAW & MED. 520.
204. Id.
205. Id. Her mother's wishes were not entirely clear. The court denied the hospital's re-
quest, holding: "Jane Doe may be dying, but she has yet to die, even under the broadest
definition of that term .... To say that because her physicians have decided that there is no
hope for 'meaningful recovery' life support should be removed comes close to imposing a duty
to die on the terminally ill. This society does not impose such a duty[.]" Id., Verbatim at 531.
206. Council on Scientific Affairs & Council on Ethical & Judicial Affairs, Presistent Vege-




where the person was incorrectly diagnosed or the condition was not perma-
nent. Further, although there is a generally accepted medical definition of
PVS,2° 7 courts use varying, inconsistent definitions. In Cruzan v. Director,
Missouri Department of Health,208 for example, the Court defined PVS as "a
condition in which a person exhibits motor reflexes but evinces no indica-
tions of significant cognitive function. '20 9 Dr. Ronald Cranford, however,
describes PVS as a condition where the person has no consciousness or inter-
action with the environment.210
Christine Busalacchi's life further illustrates the ambiguity of PVS diagno-
sis and the resulting dangers. Christine suffered a severe head trauma in an
automobile accident in 1987.211 Six months after her accident, doctors diag-
nosed her condition as PVS, and a gastrostomy feeding tube was surgically
implanted.2 12 In 1988, the Missouri Rehabilitationn Center notified Chris-
tine's father that Christine would be discharged. He attempted to transfer
her to a Minnesota hospital, so Dr. Ronald Cranford could evaluate her and
recommend removal of her nutritional support.2 13 The state intervened,
however, requesting that the court permanently enjoin the father from or-
dering the removal of the feeding tube. State evidence indicated that Chris-
tine was not in a persistive vegetative state and that her PVS classification
had been removed. Evidence demonstrated that Christine was interactive
with her environment. She could sit up, eat orally, communicate with a
207. Id.
208. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
209. Id. at 266 (emphasis added). This definition was also adopted in In re Busalacchi,
1991 WL 26851 (Mo. App. 1991). In 1991, the National Center for State Courts promulgated
the Guidelines for State Court Decision Making in Authorizing or Withholding Life-Sus-
taining Medical Treatment which listed the following definitional characteristics of PVS:
Basic Definition: Irreversible loss of all neocortical functions; brain stem
functions intact.
Clinical Syndrome: Awake, but unaware; eyes open unconsciousness;
sleep/wake cycles present; respirator independence.
Anatomic Substrate of Neurologic Damage; Varies, but most commonly ex-
tensive destruction of neocortex (hypoxic-ischemic encephalopathy) or subcorti-
cal white matter (head trauma).
Onset and Course: Sudden onset, secondary to hypexicischemic insult or
acute head trauma.
Prognosis for Survival in Terms of Cardio-Respiratory Functions; usually
long-term, years or even decades.
Time When Prognosis for Recovery of Neurologic Functions can Be Deter-
mined with a High Degree of Certainty: Varies by cause; in hypoxic-ischemic
encephalopathy, usually 1-3 months, in head trauma, usually 6-12 months.
Degree of Physical or Psychological Suffering: None.
NAT'L CTR. FOR ST. CT., GUIDELINES FOR STATE COURT DECISION MAKING IN AUTHORIZ-
ING OR WITHHOLDING LIFE-SUSTAINING MEDICAL TREATMENT (1991) (Appendix B). Con-
sistent use of this definition would substantially limit inaccurate or inconsistent assessments.
210. Ronald E. Cranford, The Persistent Vegetative State.- The Medical Reality (Getting the
Facts Straight), 18 HASTINGS CENTER REPORT, 27, 28 (Feb./Mar. 1988). This definition is
contrary to the medical definitions, which requires that no cognitive function exist.
211. In re Busalacchi, No. 59582, 1991 WL 26851, at *1 (Mo. App. 1991).
212. Id. at 1.
213. Id. Cranford testified in Cruzan v. Harmon, that he will stop nutritional fluids on
consious patients who are severely mentally disabled. See Transcipt, Cruzan v. Harmon (Cir.




microswitch device, and laugh. Christine reacted to painful stimuli; she
sometimes said "hi" with prompting; her eyes followed people in the room;
and she smiled on occasion in response to auditory stimuli. 21 4 Although the
court denied her father's right to move her, it repeatedly referred to her
condition as being in a persistive vegetative state despite all the evidence to
the contrary. 21 5
In early 1993, however, Mr. Busalacchi's request was granted when the
state's case was dismissed. 2 16 Mr. Busalacchi promptly moved Christine to
Barnes Hospital where neurologists diagnosed her condition as PVS, 2 17 a
diagnosis in conflict with medical evidence. Employees at the Mount
Vernon Rehabilitation Center assert that a video tape shows Christine smil-
ing and jumping when startled, indicating that while undoubtedly severely
brain damaged, Christine is conscious, aware of her surroundings and able
to communicate on a very limited basis.2 18
The neurologists' diagnosis, however, paves the way for her feeding tube
to be disconnected. By the time this Comment is published, Christine proba-
bly will be dead. Tim Blair, spokesman for Barnes Hospital stated that "[a]s
a major neuroscience center we routinely withdraw life support from pro-
foundly impaired individuals based upon agreement between the family and
the medical staff. What's best for the family is the guiding issue."'2 19 This, in
spite of the fact that
Christine is not "dead;" she is not even sick. She is capable of taking
her entire nutritional needs orally and was (according to court records)
taking three meals a day by mouth. Her father, however, refused to
allow her to continue to eat by mouth, so she is once again receiving
nourishment through a feeding tube.220
An additional problem is that PVS, by definition, is considered perma-
nent. Cases exist, however, where PVS patients have regained conscious-
ness. In April 1989, for example, the following account was reported. An
eighty-six year-old woman, after having a stroke, fell into a coma that lasted
over four months. After diagnosing her condition as PVS, the woman's doc-
tors sought and received judicial approval to remove her feeding tube. Dur-
ing the weekend following the court's approval, the woman awoke. Upon
determining that she was alert, her doctor proceeded to describe her past
medical and legal situation and asked her what she would have wanted done.
214. Report to the Probate Division Concerning the Status of Christine Busalacchi, An
Incapacitated/Disabled Person, In re Busalacchi, No. 93799 (St. Louis County Cir. Ct. Feb. 4,
1991).
215. In re Busalacchi, No. 59482 1991 WL 26851 at 4 (Mar. 5, 1991).
216. Staci D. Kramer, Right-to-Die Case Family Silent on Woman's Fate, CHI. TRIB., Feb.
26, 1993, at N5.
217. Id.
218. Doctors Say Woman Is in Persistent Vegetative State, UPI, Feb. 25, 1993, available on
LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
219. Staci D. Kramer, Father Regains Control in Right-to-die Case, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 20,
1993, at N2.
220. Mary Senander, Keep on Fighting for the Life of Christine Busalacchi, STAR TRIB.,
Feb. 2, 1993, at 9A.
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"She replied, 'These are difficult decisions' and lapsed back into sleep. '221
In another situation, Jackie Cole suffered a massive brain hemorrhage and
she fell into a coma. Doctors later diagnosed her condition as PVS and told
her family this condition would last indefinitely.222 Her family requested
judicial approval to withdraw respirator support but the court stayed the
decision. She woke up six days later and is now fully recovered. 223
Diagnoses of other severe medical conditions are similarly suspect. The
prognoses for many disabilities improve with advances in medicine. There-
fore, disabilities previously considered severely debilitating are now less re-
strictive today.224 This "changeable meaning of particular [disabilities]
offers reason to doubt that disabled people inevitably suffer great unhappi-
ness and a lesser quality-of-life than others .... Therefore, advocates of the
quality-of-life ethics run a serious risk of preserving old assumptions about
the meaning of various disabilities. '225
B. AMBIGUOUS DEFINITIONS
The situation is further complicated when conditions and diagnoses are
defined by advocates on either side of the quality-of-life debate in order to
enhance their case. "Every debater knows the importance of defining the
terms used in the debate. If the vocabulary to be used can be manipulated to
his advantage, the other side is almost sure to lose. ' '226 For example, qual-
ity-of-life proponents may assert that it is unethical to use extraordinary
means to artificially prolong the life of useless/severely disabled people who
are a burden to themselves, their families and for society. 227 Opponents of
this ethic recharacterize the argument, asserting that it is unethical to dis-
continue food and water to save the life of people with severe mental and
physical disabilities merely because they require assistance to participate in
society. This lack of clear definitional guidelines renders any decision-mak-
ing process useless because the situation at issue can be characterized ac-
cording to any desired outcome. Consider the following situations. 228 In
1984, a ninety-two year-old woman required surgery to reinsert her gastros-
tomy tube which had become dislodged.229 Her court-appointed guardian
refused permission, however, and a Massachusetts court affirmed the guard-
221. The judge withdrew the order. See Sam Howe Verhovek, New York Judge Revokes
Right-to-Die Order as Patient in Coma Wakes, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 1989, at B3.
222. Nancy Gibbs, Love and Let Die, TIME, Mar. 19, 1990, at 62, 70.
223. Id. She still suffers some memory loss. There are additional documented cases of
people regaining consciousness after a PVS diagnosis. See BUCHANAN & BROCK, supra note
11, at 131 (citing cases of partial recovery).
224. For example, a new inner-cochlea hearing aid can now allow a profoundly deaf person
to hear. Scientists are developing electronic devices to help people with paralysis walk. Com-
munication devices are enabling persons with speech and physical disabilities to communicate.
See supra note 65.
225. MINOW, supra note 185, at 320.
226. Albert E. Gunn, The Soft Underbelly of Patient Autonomy, 7 ISSUES IN L. & MED.
147 (1991).
227. See text accompanying supra note 48.
228. The irony of the two situations was noted in Marker, et al., supra note 2, at 281.
229. In re Hier, 464 N.E.2d 959 (Mass. 1984).
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ian's position. According to the court, the gastrostomy was a "major surgi-
cal procedure," which was "highly intrusive" and carried a "high risk."'230
At the same time, another ninety-four year-old woman in Massachusetts re-
quired the same surgery. After she received the necessary gastrostomy tube,
her doctors characterized her surgery as "minor stomach surgery" to "main-
tain adequate nutrition. ' 231 Why were the two women treated so differ-
ently? The person who was refused life saving treatment was Mary Hier, an
institutionalized woman with dementia (she believed she was the Queen of
England). The woman who received the necessary surgery was Rose
Kennedy.
In a 1990 case, the Illinois Supreme Court set a frightening precedent
when it permitted the withdrawal of food and water from a seventy-six-year-
old man by redefining terminal illness.232 Mr. Greenspan was diagnosed
with an organic brain disease in 1983. In 1984, a stroke left him severely
brain damaged.233 The trial court refused his guardian's request to discon-
tinue treatment because an Illinois law prohibited withdrawal of food and
water in cases where "withholding would result in death solely from the
dehydration or starvation, rather than from the existing terminal
conditions." 234
The supreme court reversed, holding that, in Greenspan's case, food and
water could be withheld because:
Mr. Greenspan is terminally ill in the sense that his illness would have
been terminal if current means of keeping him alive were unavailable.
If Mr. Greenspan's artificial food and water were discontinued by re-
moval of his feeding tube, he would die within a week at most. Such
death would result from the combination of his terminal condition gen-
erally and one of its specific results, his inability to swallow. 2 35
This holding raises major implications for people with severe disabilities.
Modern medicine has provided shunts, pace makers, and transplants. To
hold that someone who needs modern technology for life-saving or life-sus-
taining treatment is terminally ill is to classify most, if not all, severely dis-
abled people as terminal. Under this classification, medical treatment and
food and water could be withheld from Kenneth McKay and Elizabeth
Bouvia as well as most, if not all, infants born with disabilities - any person
who requires modern technology to maintain their life could be classified as
terminally ill and refused medical treatment.
Another troubling aspect for severely disabled people is the holding by the
court that Greenspan's inability to eat, not the removal of nutritional sup-
230. Id. at 964.
231. Rose Kennedy Doing Fine, Says Doctor, BOSTON GLOBE, Jul. 30, 1984 at 35.
232. In re Estate of Greenspan, 558 N.E.2d 1194 (Ill. 1990).
233. Medical evidence indicated that Greenspan had been in a chroic vegetative state for
five years. As the dissent noted, however, Greenspan could eat orally. Id. at 1207 (J. Ward,
dissenting). Even if Greenspan was accurately diagnosed, the court's analysis, which redefined
disability as a terminal illness, is faulty.
234. Id. at 1198-99.
235. Id. at 1196.
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port, would be the cause of his death.236 First, as the dissent pointed out,
Greenspan's feeding tube was inserted to increase convenience, not because
he could not swallow. 237 Second, this description could open the door to
justify any nontreatment decision. Under this description, inability to inde-
pendently eat, rather than failure to feed would be the cause of an infant's
death. Antibiotic medication could be withheld from an accident victim on
the ground that an infection killed him, not lack of treatment. Such a de-
scription is both medically and ethically unsound.
V. CONCLUSION: QUALITY OF LIFE MATTERS
Quality-of-life inquiries should examine what makes life worth living for
people, and should work to provide a worthwhile quality-of-life to all people.
In the case of people with disabilities, rather than assuming that life lacks
quality due to disability, decision-makers should question "whether the ap-
parent misery is the result of a lack of adequate support services for the
person. If, as is more likely, the issue is one of inadequate support services,
the answer is clearly to demand that those services be provided. '238 The
voice of people with disabilities echos this:
Many are wondering why society is so quick to assist a disabled person
who wants to end life when the same desire to die in an able-bodied
person is viewed as a genuine cry for help. It is the fear of no support to
live independent lives, not their disabilities, that drives people with disa-
bilities to end their lives.239
This Comment has demonstrated why the current quality-of-life ethic
must not be a basis for denying medical treatment to people with severe
disabilities. Focusing primarily on the disabilities of people, this ethic em-
braces the assumption that society was created for "normal" people, and
injustice is merely an unavoidable consequence of defects in the disabled
individual. 24° Thus, it can be used to categorically exclude entire groups of
236. Id. at 1201.
237. In re Estate of Greenspan, 558 N.E.2d at 1207 (J. Ward, dissenting).
238. Redfern Legal Center, Lives of Great Value (Oct. 31, 1989), quoted in Christopher
Newell, Lives of Inestimable Value: Life Worthy of Life, 7 ISSUES IN L. & MED. 245, 251
(1991).
239. National Legal Center Staff, Medical Treatment for Older Persons and Persons with
Disabilities: 1990 Developments, 6 ISSUES IN LAW & MED. 341, 349 (1991) (citing Coleman,
Growing Support of the"Right to Die". A Worrisome Trend, NASHVILLE BANNER, May 10,
1990, at A19).
240. Professor Martha Minow refers to the problems inherent in the exclusionary quality-
of-life ethic as the dilemma of difference. MINOW, supra note 185, at 20. The perception that
disparate treatment of severely disabled people is permissible or even necessary is inherent in
virtually all public policy decisions concerning people with severe disabilities. Minow articu-
lates five assumptions that generally drive decisions based on disability (or other difference):
Rather than viewing the characteristic in question as a comparison between an excluded indi-
vidual and some norm established by the decision-makers in power, one assumes that the
difference is in the individual. Id. at 51, 53-56. An unstated point of reference is adopted
when assessing the different individual and determining that special treatment is warranted.
This point of reference is assumed to be neutral and natural. For example, special treatment,
"when used to describe pregnancy or maternity leave, posits men as the norm and women as
different or deviant from that norm." Id. at 58. Because the differences are assumed to be
intrinsic, and the norm neutral, the decision-maker assumes that he can make impartial deter-
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people, based on a disability label, from the benefits of life.
The quality-of-life ethic should instead, return to its traditional use to pro-
mote improvements in the quality of severely disabled peoples' lives.241 Ba-
sic life necessities such as housing should be addressed. For example, rather
than devaluing a severely disabled woman's life because she is homeless or
institutionalized, efforts to improve her quality-of-life should be made by
providing her an opportunity to live in the community. Numerous demon-
stration projects across the country have proved that even the most severely
disabled individual can live in the community and be provided the necessary
support.242 Education should be also addressed. Rather than devaluing a
boy's life because he is severely disabled, efforts to improve the quality of his
life should include providing an appropriate education. School districts
throughout the United States are demonstrating that all children can learn
in inclusive settings. 243 Our quality-of-life ethic should, in other words, be
based on the assumption that people with severe disabilities are "whole peo-
ple, not defective collections of body parts, intellect, and genes which are
inherently less capable and worthy of life than so-called able-bodied peo-
minations, unbiased by any personal perspective. Id. at 52, 60-65. The assumed intrinsic dif-
ference and neutral norm also negates any value in the perspective of the different person. Id.
at 52, 66-70. The current state of society is natural, neutral and desirable. Id. at 53, 70-73.
Minow urges decision-makers to make policy decisions with the recognition that difference
determinations are comparative:
If we identify the unstated points of comparison necessary to the idea of differ-
ence, we will then examine the relationships between people who have and peo-
ple who lack the power to assign the label of different. If we explore the
environmental context that makes some trait stand out and some people seem
not to fit in, we will have the opportunity to reconsider how and for what ends
we construct and manage the environment. Then difference will no longer seem
empirically discoverable, consisting of traits inherent in the "different person."
Instead, perceptions of difference can become clues to broader problems of so-
cial policy and human responsibility.
Id. at 23.
241. See Aiken, supra note 24, at 18-21.
242. See Joyce Dawidczyk & Patricia Anderson, Going Home and Other Adventures: A
Guide to Supported Living for Persons with Disabilities, (May 1992) (unpublished manuscript
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manuscript on file with author) (describing successful three-year supported living project and
asserting that "all persons who have disabilities, including those with the most severe disabili-
ties or the most significant support needs ... can live alone or with others of their choice in
their own home or shared homes when individualized appropriate supports are developed,
accessed and maintained"); see also Jane A. Nesbit & Jay Klein, New Hampshire's Home of
Your Own (Institute on Disability, University of New Hampshire 1991) (unpublished manu-
script on file with author) (describing current project which facilitates consumer-controlled
housing for individuals with severe disabilities in New Hampshire).
243. See DOROTHY KERZNER LIPSKY & ALAN GARTNER, BEYOND SEPARATE EDUCA-
TION: QUALITY EDUCTION FOR ALL (1989); and EDUCATING ALL STUDENTS IN THE MAIN-
STREAM OF REGULAR EDUCATION (William Stainback et al. eds., 1989) (proposing
educational reform to provide for quality, inclusive education for all students, including stu-
dents with the most severe disabilities); see also, George Flynn, A School System in Transition
(Waterloo Ontario, Canada, 1989) (unpublished manuscript on file with author) (recording
how the Waterloo Region Roman Catholic School System was successfully restructured to
provide education for all school children in a fully inclusive setting).
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pie;"'244 and we should question any ethic that "is prepared to fund the elim-
ination and screening of people with disabilities, yet is not prepared
adequately to fund the personal care and education services we need to lead
autonomous, happy, and successful lives in the community. '245
244. Christopher Newell for Disabled People's International (Australia) Limited, Lives of
Inestimable Value: Life Worthy to Life, 7 ISSUES IN L. & MED. 251, 256 (1991).
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